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ABSTRACT
In this work a generalization of the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics is
presented. We first critically review the consistent histories approach to nonrelativistic quan-
tum mechanics in a mathematically rigorous way and give some general comments about it.
We investigate to what extent the consistent histories scheme is compatible with the results
of the operational formulation of quantum mechanics. According to the operational approach
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is most generally formulated in terms of effects, states and
operations. We formulate a generalized consistent histories theory using the concepts and the
terminology which have proven useful in the operational formulation of quantum mechanics.
The logical rule of the logical interpretation of quantum mechanics is generalized to the present
context. The algebraic structure of the generalized theory is studied in detail.
∗ Internet: rudolph@x4u2.desy.de
1 Introduction
This article is the outcome of an attempt to understand the relation of two seemingly com-
pletely different modern formulations of quantum mechanics. On the one hand we consider the
insightful modern operational reformulation and generalization of quantum mechanics due to
many authors. We refer the reader to the monographs by Davies (1976), Kraus (1983), Lud-
wig (1970, 1972-79, 1983), Busch, Lahti and Mittelstaedt (1991), Busch, Grabowski and Lahti
(1995) and references therein. On the other hand, we study the consistent histories approach
and particularly Omne`s’ logical interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The operational approach is based on an analysis of the quantum mechanical measuring pro-
cess and is formulated in terms of accompanying purely operational concepts: according to
the operational approach nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is most generally formulated in
terms of effects, states and operations and the accompanying notions like ‘positive operator
valued measures.’ The operational approach incorporates many ideas from the older orthodox
interpretations (cf. (Jammer, 1974; Primas, 1983; Scheibe, 1973)), in particular the measuring
process is considered to be of central importance in the foundations of quantum mechanics.
In contrast, the history approach is the outcome of an effort to deal with quantum mechanics
of single closed systems, i.e., systems which do neither interact with their environment nor are
exposed to measurements. In this approach the measuring process is not considered to be a
fundamental notion but rather a derived one.
In this work we adopt a realistic, individual interpretation of quantum mechanics. Further, we
will adopt a somewhat conservative point of view in that we will consider the operational ap-
proach as a physically fundamental and meaningful approach in the sense that its results and its
range of applications must be contained in (or derivable from) every generalized formulation of
quantum mechanics based on a realistic interpretation, in particular in the consistent histories
formulation of quantum mechanics. Thus we will investigate whether the history approach to
quantum mechanics can be formulated and generalized in terms of the notions and the concepts
of the operational formulation of quantum mechanics.
The history approach to nonrelativistic quantum mechanic has received much attention in
the last decade. The consistent histories approach to nonrelativistic quantum mechanics has
been inaugurated in a seminal paper by Griffiths (1984). Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics
in its standard formulation is not a theory which describes dynamical processes in time, but it
is a theory which gives probabilities to various possibilities. The history approach to quantum
mechanics can be looked upon as an attempt to remedy this situation by introducing time se-
quences of possibilities as a rough substitute for dynamical processes. Nowadays there are two
mainstreams of research in this field. The first one is mainly due to Roland Omne`s, who uses
histories as a framework for constructing a realistic and individual interpretation of quantum
mechanics. The resulting logical interpretation is based on some simple logical rules which we
will review below. It is thus fair to say that the logical interpretation is a purely epistemo-
logical interpretation. Histories are not necessarily considered to represent features belonging
to physical reality and are not considered to be ontological models for the quantum system
(most generally the universe) at hand, but are simply considered as a useful tool to talk about
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quantum systems (more precisely, in the logical interpretation histories are thought to represent
the only meaningful assertions about a quantum mechanical system in the language of physics).
On the other hand, Gell-Mann and Hartle consider the history approach as a convenient
setting to discuss the quantum mechanics of closed systems, i.e., most generally the universe
(Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1990a-c, 1993, 1994, 1995; Hartle, 1991, 1994). In this way they hope
to circumvent some of the conceptual and mathematical difficulties inherent in quantum cos-
mology. They propose to use histories to describe the events that have taken place and that will
take place in the universe. They pay special attention to what they call quasiclassical domains.
[They prefer now the term quasiclassical realm (Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1995).] Loosely speak-
ing a quasiclassical domain is an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive coarse-grained alternative
histories which can be ascribed probabilities and whose individual histories are described largely
by alternative values of a limited set of quasiclassical variables (at a succession of times) which
exhibit patterns of classical correlation in time subject to quantum mechanical fluctuations. In
order to make pre- and retrodiction one needs information about the initial state of the universe
and about past events. Since the human sensory perceptions are rather limited, we can deal in
general only with sets of alternative coarse-grained histories. Furthermore, it is only possible to
ascribe probabilities to suitably coarse-grained histories provided some consistency conditions
are satisfied. The research in this direction is faced with severe difficulties, as discussed by
Dowker and Kent (1996) and Kent (1995). In this work we will not be concerned with the
Gell-Mann−Hartle approach.
Griffiths has recently proposed an interesting modification of these two approaches (Grif-
fiths, 1995). Griffiths essentially claims (amongst others) that inconsistent histories can be
considered to be ‘objectively’ true separately even though inconsistent histories cannot be com-
bined, either in constructing descriptions or in making logical inferences about them, i.e., even
though assertions involving inconsistent histories are meaningless.
Many of the central concepts of the modern operational formulation are foreign to the stan-
dard consistent histories approach and therefore the standard consistent histories approach
is considerably and unnecessarily restricted in its range of applications. In the present work
we formulate a generalized consistent histories theory using the terminology and the concepts
which have proven useful in the operational formulation of quantum mechanics. The starting
points of the present work are the fact that the observables in quantum mechanics have to
be identified with positive operator valued measures and the reasonable claim that the consis-
tent histories approach should take into account the full set of quantum mechanical observables.
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we rewrite the formalism of the standard
consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics in full generality in a mathematically pre-
cise way. Moreover, this section contains a brief (and inevitably incomplete) introduction to the
operational formulation of quantum mechanics based on the notion of effect and the concept
of generalized observables. The first part of Section 2 contains a discussion of the interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics underlying our generalized history approach, i.e., we discuss the
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meaning of concepts like ‘observable,’ ‘property,’ and the like. The reader should not expect
a thorough philosophical analysis. On the contrary, we adopt philosophically somewhat naive
but physically pragmatic points of view. In Section 3 some aspects of the logical interpretation
of quantum mechanics are discussed. However, the treatment in Section 3 is by no means
complete and only the aspect relevant for this work are discussed. An extensive discussion of
the logical interpretation can be found in Omne`s’ original work (Omne`s, 1988a-c, 1989, 1990,
1992, 1994, 1995). In Section 4 we describe a generalized history theory, which generalizes
the standard consistent histories approach. In Section 4 the algebraic and order structures
of our generalized history approach are investigated. The notion of decoherence functional is
extended to the generalized framework and some of its elementary properties are discussed. It
will turn out that so-called effect algebras or difference posets (D-posets) are the basic algebraic
structure in our formulation. We explicitly construct the tensor product of two sets of effects
on some Hilbert space in the category of effect algebras. The central result of Section 4.3 is the
identification of the consistent sets of generalized histories on which the decoherence functional
induces a probability measure and the formulation of the generalized logical rule of interpre-
tation. Finally, in Section 4.4 we use our results to study the possible algebraic structures of
more general quantum mechanical history theories not necessarily restricted to nonrelativistic
theories. This can be viewed as a generalization of Isham’s temporal quantum logic (Isham,
1994). In Section 5 we discuss our results and present our conclusions.
It must be emphasized that the representation and the interpretation of the consistent
histories approach in this work might not be accepted by the authors cited. The present work
solely reflects the inclination and the views of this author.
2 Basic Facts about Consistent Histories and Opera-
tional Quantum Mechanics
In this section we first review formal aspects of the consistent histories approach to quantum
theory initiated by Griffiths and further developed by Omne`s, Gell-Mann and Hartle and Isham
and others. This section contains essentially known material. It can be read as a commentary
on the standard texts. There is no general agreement in the literature, however, concerning
the interpretational issues discussed in this section. Our treatment is based on a realistic and
individual interpretation of probabilities in quantum mechanics as outlined, e.g., in (Busch et
al., 1995; Omne`s, 1992, 1994; Popper, 1982). [The views adopted in the present work differ,
however, in some aspects from those in (Busch et al., 1995; Omne`s, 1992, 1994; Popper, 1982).]
This interpretation has as one of its basic assumptions that there exists a definite physical
reality, which exists independently of and changes independently of (human) observers.
Remark 1 Quantum mechanics as a probabilistic theory provides no solution of the problem
of the ‘actualization of facts.’ This is the problem why some events take place in the real world
while others do not. In quantum measurement theory this problem occurs as ‘objectification
problem’ (Busch et al., 1991).
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In our interpretation we carefully distinguish between the mathematical formalism of a theory
(the syntactical part of a theory) and the semantical part of a theory (the interpretation), which
relates some abstract concepts of the mathematical formalism to the objects of physical reality
which they represent. Only those parts of the mathematical formalism can be thought of as
corresponding to elements of physical reality which are interpreted in the semantical part of
the theory.
A physical system is a part of the physical reality which has to be regarded (in at least one
respect) as a physical unit. The relevant aspects characterizing a physical system should not
be affected by the interaction with other parts of physical reality (at least to a certain degree
of accuracy). Every physical theory (in particular quantum mechanics) is concerned with the
description (and understanding) of some physical systems. In this work we do not aim to give a
precise definition of the notion ‘physical system,’ but rather adopt an abstract (but pragmatic)
point of view and represent a physical system in the mathematical formalism by a collection of
observables (‘the observables of the system’). Observables are part of the semantical language
of physical theories; they represent and systematize in the mathematical formalism possible
events which may occur in the physical systems and which can be described by the theory at
hand.
There is a longstanding debate in quantum physics which entities in the formalism can be
identified with properties of a system and what structure the space of all properties is sup-
posed to have. No agreement has been achieved yet, for some different points of view see,
e.g., (Omne`s, 1994; Ludwig, 1983; von Neumann, 1932; Giuntini and Greuling, 1989; Cattaneo
and Laudisa, 1994). Most authors use the terminology introduced by von Neumann, who has
identified the projection operators with the possible ‘properties’ of the quantum mechanical
system (von Neumann, 1932). However, Ludwig (1970, 1983) has stressed that the space of all
projection operators does not satisfy some conditions which may intuitively be associated with
the notion of ‘property.’ In contrast, the author of the present work believes that the problem
of identifying the properties of a quantum mechanical system is a pseudo-problem. We simply
identify the possible properties of a system with the propositions specifying the domain of val-
ues for some observable. That is, we view a system as a carrier of properties and as a bearer
of dispositions. However, in the sequel we will use the phrase ‘proposition about a system’ or
following partly Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936) the term physical quality for this concept
(actually this term has been used in a different sense by Birkhoff and von Neumann) and not
the term ’property’ and also not the term ‘pseudoproperty’ coined by Ludwig. What exactly
we mean by physical quality and physical property will be specified below. Whether or not the
physical qualities and physical properties can be measured ideally or repeatedly (Busch et al.,
1995) and whether or not the set of all qualities and the set of all properties satisfies some
more or less intuitive axioms as claimed, e.g., by Ludwig, is of no concern to us. The notions
of observable, physical quality and even the features which characterize a physical system as
such are inferred on theoretical grounds; that is, which features characterize a physical system
and what a physical quality is depends upon the theory and upon the interpretation we use.
(However, it is clear that the question whether a given theory with its accompanying notions of
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system and physical quality is a ‘good’ theory cannot be decided on purely theoretical grounds.)
In this work we encounter the following point of view which is essentially due to Griffiths
(1995): We assert that for a quantum mechanical system there are several incompatible (or
complementary) frameworks for its theoretical description in terms of physical qualities and
that there are several incompatible (or complementary) frameworks for making logical infer-
ences about physical qualities or about time sequences of physical qualities. We do not even
claim that the possible frameworks for the theoretical description coincide with the possible
frameworks for making logical inferences. (As we will see below in our generalized history
approach this is nevertheless the case.) All different frameworks (or in Griffiths’ terminology
topics of conversation) are similarly objective. That is, the symmetrical treatment of several
incompatible frameworks in the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is not broken
in the interpretation and (as is asserted in the interpretation) also not in the physical reality in
the following sense: it is the whole objective physical situation (for instance an experimental
arrangement) which determines the framework that should be used for the description and
reasoning.
Thus we assert that for every physical system there are elements of physical reality which can-
not be combined either in constructing a theoretical description or in making logical inferences
about them. Such complementary elements of reality are not independent. The exact form
of the framework for the theoretical description and for making logical inferences is specified
below in Rule 1 for the standard logical interpretation of quantum mechanics and in Rule 2 for
the generalized logical interpretation developed in this work.
We consider a quantum mechanical system S without superselection rules represented by
a separable complex Hilbert space H and a Hamiltonian operator H . Every physical state of
the considered system is mathematically represented by a density operator on H, i.e., a linear,
positive, trace-class operator on H with trace 1. We denote the set of all trace-class operators
on H by T (H) and the set of all density operators on H by T (H)+1 . The time evolution is
governed by the unitary operator U(t′, t) = exp(−i(t′ − t)H/~) which maps states at time t
into states at time t′ and satisfies U(t′′, t′)U(t′, t) = U(t′′, t) and U(t, t) = 1.
In the familiar formulations of quantum mechanics the observables are identified with (and
represented by) the self-adjoint operators on H and according to the spectral theorem ob-
servables can be identified with projection operator valued (PV) measures on the real line;
that is, there is a one-to-one correspondence between self-adjoint operators on H and maps
O : B(R) → P(H), such that O(R) = 1 and O(∪iKi) = ∑iO(Ki) for every pairwise disjoint
sequence {Ki}i in B(R) (the series converging in the ultraweak topology). Here B(R) denotes
the Borel σ-algebra of R and P(H) denotes the set of projection operators on H, i.e., self-adjoint
operators P with P = PP . PV measures are also called spectral measures.
We adopt the following physical interpretation of the so defined observables: all meaningful
propositions about the considered system specify that the value of some observable O lies in
some set B ∈ B(R). We also say that such a specification of the value of some observable repre-
sents a physical quality of the system or a proposition about a system; in one word a proposition
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is a speak-able. All other propositions about the system in the formalism of the theory are
considered as representing only syntactical statements. The same idea is often expressed in
a modern language by saying that only observables represent the be-ables in the theory and
that all other objects in the mathematical formalism have no beable status. We can state our
assertion also as follows: beables represent the possible events that may occur in the physical
system (Bell, 1987).
Note 1 Beables as defined above are surely the pre-eminent concepts in the theory that may be thought
of as corresponding to some elements of reality. We make no attempt to define what the term reality
exactly means and we do not claim that beables are the only elements in the formalism which may
be considered real. The term beable is, however, introduced to stress that there are several degrees of
reality in a physical theory. By way of an example, the possible values of the coordinates of an ele-
mentary particle describe possible events in physical reality and have thus beable status in the quantum
mechanical description of the particle, whereas, say, the number of degrees of freedom of the same
elementary particle is a somewhat abstract characteristic of the particle which has no beable status in
the theory but which may nevertheless be considered real. In particular the state of the system has no
beable status in the interpretation of quantum mechanics outlined here. The state of a system collects
all necessary information of the past history of the system (e.g., preparation procedures) to compute
probabilities for future events. In the words of Popper (1982) ‘the real state of a physical system, at
any moment, may be conceived as the sum total of its dispositions−or its potentialities, or possibilities,
or propensities.’ Thus we think of the state as an abstract concept in the syntactical part of the theory
(i.e., in the mathematical formalism) characterizing the real physical system. To be not misunderstood,
states are completely objective; even though we do not think of states as real properties of the physical
system, we may nevertheless consider states as properties of the integral physical situation. Since quan-
tum mechanics is a probabilistic theory, Gleason’s theorem fixes the notion of state in the formalism
of quantum mechanics (see below).
The probability of a physical quality represented by the projection operator P is in the state
represented by the density operator ̺ given by tr(̺P ), where tr denotes the trace in H.
There is no agreement in the literature concerning the interpretation of this probability.
According to a minimal operational interpretation it represents the probability that a physical
quality is found in a measurement.
At this point it should be stressed that one has to carefully distinguish between physical
qualities and the associated projection operators. Several physical qualities may correspond to
the same projection operator. However, from the operational approach to quantum mechanics
(Kraus, 1983; Ludwig, 1983) it follows, that different physical qualities corresponding to the
same projection operator cannot be distinguished by performing yes−no experiments and thus
can only collectively be considered to be true or false. For this reason in standard quantum
mechanics the projection operators are said to represent properties of the system.
Remark 2 In this work we adopt Popper’s propensity interpretation of probabilities (Popper,
1959/60, 1982). In the propensity interpretation the classes of experimentally indistinguish-
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able physical qualities (represented by some projection operator) represent the “beables” and the
probabilities are thought to express the tendencies in the behaviour of the system. They are
measures of the propensity or of the tendency of a possibility (i.e., a beable) to realize itself
upon repetition. Probabilities are associated with a single system in contrast to the usual fre-
quency interpretation of probabilities where probabilities are numbers characterizing ensembles
of (similarly prepared) systems. Nevertheless the probabilistic statements in the theory can be
tested by actual sequences of measurements. Popper ascribes the priority for the propensity
interpretation to a large extend to Lande´ (1965).
Note 2 A comprehensive and critical discussion of different possibilities to consistently interpret the
term ‘probability’ can be found in the monographs by K. Popper (1982, 1994). In his discussion
of quantum mechanics Popper discusses besides the propensity interpretation of probability various
issues regarding the interpretation of quantum mechanics and other related areas of physics. However,
although the author of the present work believes that the propensity interpretation of probability is well-
suited for the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics and for the logical interpretation,
the author does not wish to imply that he accepts all of the assertions and claims in (Popper, 1982,
1994). On the contrary, this author believes that Popper’s interpretation of quantum mechanics as a
whole is physically incomplete and that something like the logical rule of interpretation has to be added
to it in order to make it physically complete.
According to standard quantum mechanics physical qualities correspond to projection op-
erators and observables to PV measures. However, as discussed at length by Davies (1976),
Kraus (1983) and Busch et al. (1991, 1995) there is good reason to generalize the usual notion of
an observable in quantum mechanics. These generalized observables have been developed and
applied independently in various branches of physics, such as, e.g., stochastic quantum mechan-
ics (Prugoveˇcki, 1992), quantum optics (Davies, 1976) or even the (conceptual) foundations of
quantum mechanics (Ludwig, 1983). For a detailed motivation and physical justification for the
introduction of generalized observables, we refer in particular to the recent lucid monograph
by Busch, Grabowski and Lahti (1995).
Positive and bounded operators F on H, satisfying
0 ≤ F ≤ 1,
are commonly called effects and the set of all effects on the Hilbert space H will be denoted
by E(H). We further denote the set of all bounded, linear operators on H by B(H), the set of
all positive (and hence Hermitean), linear, bounded operators on H by B(H)+, and the set of
all projection operators on H by P(H).
If H is an infinite dimensional Hilbert space, then the set of all projection operators P(H) on
H is weakly dense in E(H) (Davies, 1976).
Generalized observables are now identified with positive operator valued (POV) mea-
sures on some measurable space (Ω,F), i.e., maps O : F → E(H) with the properties:
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• O(A) ≥ O(∅), for all A ∈ F ;
• Let {Ai} be a countable set of disjoint sets in F , then O(∪iAi) = ∑i O(Ai), the series
converging ultraweakly;
• O(Ω) = 1.
Generalized observables are also called effect valued measures. Ordinary observables
(associated with self-adjoint operators on H) are then identified with the projection valued
measures on the real line R.
Note 3 Notice, that in general there is no unambiguous representation of generalized observables as
self-adjoint operators on H. However, there is a one-one correspondence between maximal symmetric
operators on H and POV measures on H (Busch et al., 1995).
The set Ω represents the set of all possible values of the observable O and F represents the
allowed coarse-grainings in Ω. Generalized observables which are not ordinary observables are
often also called unsharp observables.
Note 4 The term unsharp observable is used with different meanings in the literature, see e.g., (Busch
et al., 1995). However, the term unsharp is somewhat misleading. Admittedly, some (but not all) gen-
eralized observables arise as smeared versions of ordinary observables. In general, however, generalized
observables must not be considered as unsharp or limited counterparts of some underlying more sharply
defined observables, but rather as independent entities in their own right.
According to Gleason’s theorem, for every positive, normalized σ-additive map p : E(H)→
[0, 1], also called generalized probability measure, there exists a unique ̺ ∈ T (H)+1 , such that
p(F ) = tr(̺F ). (A map p : E(H)→ [0, 1] is called σ-additive if for every countable collection
{Ei} of elements of E(H) such that∑iEi ≤ 1, one has p (∑iEi) = ∑i p(Ei) (convergence in the
weak operator topology).) It also follows from Gleason’s theorem that an effect valued measure
represents the most general notion of an observable compatible with the probabilistic structure
of Hilbert space quantum mechanics. Gleason’s theorem has first been proved in (Gleason,
1957); a short proof can for instance be found in (Maeda, 1989).
Generalizing our above terminology, we regard all propositions specifying the value of some
(generalized) observable as (generalized) physical qualities . In order to discriminate physical
qualities corresponding to ordinary observables from physical qualities corresponding to gener-
alized observables, we will sometimes call the former ‘ordinary physical qualities’ and the latter
‘generalized physical qualities.’ In the generalized approach to every physical quality there is
associated one effect operator.
Every physical quality represents some dichotomy (or binary alternative or yes-no alterna-
tive) at every instant of time. There are physical qualities which are always true, e.g., the
physical qualities asserting that the value of some observable lies somewhere (without further
specification) in the space of its possible values. Such physical qualities will be pairwise iden-
tified and collectively denoted by 1. Similarly, physical qualities which are always false will
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also be pairwise identified and collectively denoted by 0. We will denote the set of all physical
qualities (with this identification) of a quantum system S with corresponding Hilbert space H
by P(H). Notice, that a (nontrivial) member p of P(H) is a proposition specifying the value of
some observable and is not an operator on H in some way or other related to the proposition p.
The effect operator p associated with a physical quality p will be denoted by p = Z(p), thus
defining a map Z : P(H)→ E(H).
It is worthwhile to mention that in the operational approach to quantum mechanics states
are defined as equivalence classes of preparing instruments of a system, where two preparing
instruments are said to be equivalent if they cannot be distinguished by measuring binary alter-
natives (Kraus, 1983; Ludwig, 1983). Moreover, effects can also be defined as equivalence classes
of measuring instruments performing yes−no measurements, where two measuring instruments
are called equivalent if for every state both measuring instruments are triggered with equal
frequencies. Since, however, every measuring process can be thought of as being composed of
elementary yes−no measurements of physical qualities (at least in principle) (Beltrametti and
Cassinelli, 1981; Jauch, 1968) and since physical qualities represented by the same effect oper-
ator cannot be distinguished from each other by performing yes−no measurements, it follows
that in quantum mechanics every pair of physical qualities which are represented by the same effect
operator must be considered equivalent: that is, in quantum mechanics one is not interested in sin-
gle physical qualities but in equivalence classes of physical qualities. We will call this equivalence
classes of physical qualities physical properties of the physical system. It is reasonable
to assume that physical properties of a quantum mechanical system are in one-to-one corre-
spondence with effect operators (Kraus, 1983). Therefore in generalized quantum mechanics
the effect operators represent the beables of the theory in the mathematical formalism. In the
standard formulation of quantum mechanics often only the projection operators are referred to
as representing ‘properties’ of the quantum system (following a terminology introduced by von
Neumann (1932)). Thus effect operators are often referred to as representing so-called ‘unsharp
properties.’ However, in general effect operators must not be considered as unsharp or smeared
counterparts of some underlying more sharply defined properties but as independent entities in their
own right. Since physical properties represented by effect operators can in general neither be
measured ideally without disturbing the system nor measured repeatedly, one may say, loosely
speaking, that projection operators represent stable properties and that all other effect operators
represent unstable properties.
Again the probability of some physical property F is in the state ̺ given by tr(F̺).
Summing up, throughout this paper we adopt the following conventions: by a physically
meaningful proposition about a system we mean a statement (associated with some effect oper-
ator) specifying the value of a generalized observable; we also talk about physical qualities in
this connection; a proposition about a system is thus a statement in the semantical language of
physics asserting the truth (or realization) of some physical qualities. By a physical property of
a system we mean an equivalence class of physical qualities which cannot be distinguished by
measuring binary alternatives. Physical properties are in one-one correspondence with effect
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operators.
We now turn to the discussion of histories in standard nonrelativistic quantum mechanics,
which, loosely speaking, are defined to be sequences of projection operators on H. In standard
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics a history could alternatively be defined as time sequence of
physical qualities since (as already remarked above and as will become clearer below) different
physical qualities corresponding to the same projection operator can only simultaneously be
true. Thus we stick to the usual definition
Definition 1 A homogeneous history is a map h : R → P(H), t 7→ ht. We call ti(h) :=
min(t ∈ R | ht 6= 1) the initial and tf (h) := max(t ∈ R | ht 6= 1) the final time of h
respectively. Furthermore, the support of h is given by s(h) := {t ∈ R | ht 6= 1}. If s(h) is
finite, countable or uncountable, then we say that h is a finite, countable or uncountable
history respectively. The space of all homogeneous histories will be denoted by H(H), the space
of all finite homogeneous histories by Hfin(H) and the space of all finite homogeneous histories
with support S by HS(H).
In this work we focus attention on finite histories. In the following we will identify every
homogeneous history h with the string of its nontrivial projection operators, i.e., we write
h ≃ {htk}tk∈s(h).
For every finite subset S of R we can consider the Hilbert tensor product ⊗t∈SH and the
algebra B⊗S (H) of bounded linear operators on ⊗t∈SH. It has been pointed out by Isham (1994)
that for any fixed S there is an injective (but not surjective) correspondence σS between finite
histories with support S and elements of B⊗S (H) given by
σS : HS(H)→ B⊗S (H), h ≃ {htk}tk∈S 7→ ⊗tk∈Shtk .
The finite homogeneous histories with support S can therefore be identified with projection
operators on ⊗t∈SH. The set of all projection operators on ⊗t∈SH will in the sequel be denoted
by P⊗S (H). However, not all projection operators in P⊗S (H) have the form σS(h) with h ∈
HS(H).
If a homogeneous history vanishes for some t0 ∈ R, i.e., ht0 = 0, then we say that h is a zero
history. All zero histories are collectively denoted by 0, slightly abusing the notation.
Definition 2 Let h, k ∈ H(H). We say that k is coarser than h if ht ≤ kt for all t ∈ R
and write h ≤ k. If furthermore h 6= k, then we write h < k. The set H(H) equipped with the
relation ≤ is a partially ordered set.
Definition 3 Two homogeneous histories h and k are said to be disjoint if there is some
t ∈ R such that htkt = 0.
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The identification of finite homogeneous histories with support S with projection operators
on ⊗t∈SH allows for the introduction of a much broader class of histories. To this end we recall
the well-known fact that the set P(H) of projection operators on a Hilbert space H carries the
structure of an orthocomplemented complete lattice provided for p1, p2 ∈ P(H) one defines [a]
p1 ≤ p2 if p1 projects on a subspace of the range of p2, (≤ defines a partial order on P(H)),
[b] the join p1 ∨ p2 of p1 and p2 to be the projection operator which projects on the smallest
closed subspace of H which contains the subspaces p1H and p2H, [c] the meet p1 ∧ p2 of p1
and p2 to be the projection operator which projects on the intersection of p1H and p2H and
[d] the orthocomplementation ¬p1 of p1 to be the projection operator which projects on the
complement of p1H in H (Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936).
Definition 4 Let S be a finite subset of R, then we call the space KS(H) := P⊗S (H) of projection
operators on ⊗t∈SH the space of finite inhomogeneous histories with support S. The
space of all finite inhomogeneous histories with arbitrary support will be denoted by Kfin(H) or
by P⊗fin(H).
The lattice operations on P⊗S (H) induce corresponding operations on the finite homogeneous
histories in Hfin(H), which are explicitly described in the following remarks.
Remark 3 Let h, k ∈ Hfin(H) be two finite homogeneous histories, then the join h ∨ k of h
and k is defined to be the unique finite history with support s(h) ∪ s(k) which is represented
in P⊗
s(h)∪s(k)(H) by
(
⊗ti∈s(h)hti
)∨ (⊗sj∈s(k)ksj). The history h ∨ k may be not homogeneous.
In this case h ∨ k is an inhomogeneous history. The join ∨j hj of any finite sequence {hj}
of pairwise disjoint homogeneous histories is analogously defined to be the unique finite history
with support
⋃
j s(hj) which is represented in P⊗∪js(hj)(H) by
∨
j
(
⊗ti∈s(hj)hti
)
.
Remark 4 Let h, k ∈ Hfin(H) be two finite homogeneous histories, then the meet h ∧ k of h
and k satisfies that (h∧k)t := ht∧kt is the projection operator on the intersection of the ranges
of ht and kt for all t ∈ R. The meet operation maps pairs of finite homogeneous histories to a
finite homogeneous history.
Remark 5 Let h be a finite homogeneous history with support s(h), then ¬h is the unique
history with support s(h) which in P⊗fin(H) is represented by 1 −
⊗
t∈s(h) ht. We call ¬h the
negation of h. The negation ¬h of a finite homogeneous history h may be inhomogeneous.
Obviously the negation satisfies h ∨ ¬h = 1 and h ∧ ¬h = 0. It is clear that ¬h is uniquely
determined by this two conditions.
Lemma 1 Let S be a finite subset of R, then the set KS(H) is an orthocomplemented complete
lattice.
Remark 6 The join, meet and orthocomplementation operations on KS(H) (where S is a finite
subset of R) and on P⊗fin(H) are denoted by the same symbols (slightly abusing the notation).
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In (Isham, 1994) it is indicated how to imbed KS(H) into an infinite tensor product of
operator algebras and how to furnish the latter with a Hilbert lattice structure.
Definition 5 Two (possibly inhomogeneous) finite histories h and k are said to be disjoint
if h ≤ ¬k, where ≤ is the partial order on Ks(h)∪s(k)(H). We write h ⊥ k.
Lemma 2 Let h and k denote two disjoint finite histories, then h ∧ k = 0.
Definition 6 A history h ∈ HS(H) is called a simple history if ht is a projection operator
on a one dimensional subspace of H for every t ∈ S.
Lemma 3 For every finite S ⊂ R the space P⊗S (H) can be generated from HS(H) by the
application of a countably infinite number of ∨, ∧ and ¬ operations.
This follows from the fact that, say, in the case of the tensor product H1⊗H2 the set {en1⊗en2}
forms an orthonormal basis for H1 ⊗H2 if and only if {en1} and {en2} form orthonormal bases
for H1 and H2, respectively. A moments thought shows even more, namely
Lemma 4 For every finite S ⊂ R the set P⊗S (H) can be generated from the set of all simple
histories in HS(H) by the application of a countably infinite number of ∨ operations.
Remark 7 For every finite S ⊂ R the meet, join and orthocomplementation operations on
P⊗S (H) induce a meet, join and an orthocomplementation operation on P⊗fin(H) respectively
which will be denoted by the same symbols.
Definition 7 Let A denote a finite collection {hk} of histories in Kfin(H). Then A is said to
be disjoint if each pair of histories in A is disjoint. A is said to be complete if ∨k hk = 1.
Furthermore, to every finite homogeneous history h ∈ Hfin(H) we associate its class
operator with respect to the fiducial time t0
Ct0(h) := U(t0, tn)htnU(tn, tn−1)htn−1 ...U(t2, t1)ht1U(t1, t0) (1)
= U(t0, ti(h))htn(tn)htn−1(tn−1)...ht1(t1)U(ti(h), t0), (2)
where we have defined the Heisenberg picture operators
htk(tk) := U(tk, ti(h))
†htkU(tk, ti(h))
with respect to the initial time ti(h) of h. The class operators are extended to finite inhomo-
geneous histories by requiring that Ct0 is additive in the following sense
Ct0(h ∨ k) := Ct0(h) + Ct0(k) whenever h ⊥ k (3)
Ct0(¬h) := 1− Ct0(h). (4)
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This definitions are compatible with the lattice theoretical identities ¬(h ∨ k) = (¬h) ∧ (¬k)
and ¬(h ∧ k) = (¬h) ∨ (¬k). Notice, that Equation 4 is a consequence of Equation 3. In the
language of Birkhoff (1967) Ct0 is an operator-valued valuation on P⊗S (H) for every finite
S ⊂ R. It follows from a lemma in (Birkhoff, 1967, Chapter X.1.) that Equations 3 and 4 are
equivalent to
Ct0(h ∨ k) := Ct0(h) + Ct0(k), whenever h ⊥ k. (5)
The Equations 3 and 4 are motivated by the identities valid for all disjoint h, k ∈ P⊗fin(H):
h ∨ k = h+ k,
¬h = 1− h.
The analogue of Equation 5 for inhomogeneous histories which are not finitely generated is
Ct0
( ∞∨
i=1
hi
)
:=
∞∑
i=1
Ct0(hi), if hj ⊥
j−1∨
i=1
hi
 for every j, (6)
the series converging ultraweakly. It is clear that the left hand sides of Equation 3 and of Equa-
tion 6 are well-defined. This can be easily seen from Lemma 4 and from the definition of the
tensor product ⊗t∈SH. We mention that the fiducial time t0 can be chosen completely arbitrary.
By virtue of Lemma 4 it is therefore enough to know the class operators of every finite
simple homogeneous history.
Definition 8 Let the state of a quantum mechanical system at time t0 be given by the density
operator ̺(t0). For every pair h and k of finite homogeneous histories we define the decoher-
ence weight of h and k by
d̺(h, k) := tr
(
Ct0(h)̺(t0)Ct0(k)
†) . (7)
The functional d̺ : Hfin(H)×Hfin(H)→ C, (h, k) 7→ d̺(h, k) will be called the decoherence
functional associated with the state ̺. The decoherence functional is in an obvious
way extended to finite inhomogeneous histories using Equations 3 and 6.
Lemma 5 Let h, h′ and k denote finite histories. The decoherence functional d̺ satisfies
• d̺(h, h) ∈ R and d̺(h, h) ≥ 0.
• d̺(h, k) = d̺(k, h)∗.
• d̺(1, 1) = 1.
• d̺(h ∨ h′, k) = d̺(h, k) + d̺(h′, k), whenever h ⊥ h′.
• d̺(0, h) = 0, for all h.
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Now fix h and vary ̺ in p̺(h) := d̺(h, h). Then p̺(h) is a positive, linear, bounded
functional on T (H)+1 . Therefore it follows from Gleason’s theorem that there exists a unique
effect F (h) ∈ E(H) such that
d̺(h, h) = tr[̺F (h)].
Obviously
F (h) = Ct0(h)
†Ct0(h).
We call F (h) the effect associated with the finite history h. The map F : Hfin(H) → E(H) is
many-to-one and therefore information about h is lost when considering F (h) instead of h.
Consistent sets of histories
Definition 9 Let h and k be two disjoint histories in P⊗fin(H). The histories h and k are said
to be preconsistent with respect to the state ̺ if Re d̺(h, k) = 0. Any collection
C of histories in P⊗fin(H) is said to be preconsistent with respect to the state ̺ if
every pair of disjoint histories in C is preconsistent with respect to the state ̺. Any collection
C′ of histories in P⊗fin(H) is said to be consistent with respect to the state ̺ if C′
is a Boolean algebra (with respect to the meet, join and orthocomplementation in P⊗fin(H), see
Remark 7 and with unit 1C′) and if C′ is preconsistent with respect to the state ̺.
Note that our above terminology differs somewhat from the terminology used by other
authors. Further, some authors call a pair h, k of histories weakly decoherent if it satisfies
Re d̺(h, k) = 0 and mediumly decoherent if it satisfies d̺(h, k) = 0. There can be found
other related notions of decoherence and consistency in the literature, see, e.g., (Gell-Mann
and Hartle, 1995; Finkelstein, 1993; Zeh, n.d.). The condition Re d̺(h, k) = 0 is interpreted in
physical terms by saying that the events h and k have vanishing interference in the state ̺.
The notion of consistency is important because it is the key to a probability interpretation of
the numbers d̺(h, h) for some (pre-)consistent sets of histories.
Let us recall that usually a probability space is defined to be a triple (Ω,A, p), where Ω is an
arbitrary set, A is a Boolean σ-algebra of subsets of Ω and p is a probability measure on A.
This can be generalized as follows
Definition 10 Let L be a partially ordered set and B ⊂ L be a Boolean lattice. A nonnegative
valuation m : B → R+ on B which is additive
m
[
N∨
k=1
αk
]
=
N∑
k=1
m[αk], if αk ∧
(
k−1∨
i=1
αi
)
= 0, for every k < N,
is called a finite measure on B. If B is a Borel lattice, then N may be taken to be ∞. In
this case m is σ-additive. If B is not a Borel lattice, then N is always finite. If furthermore
m[1B] = 1, then m is called a probability measure on B and the triple (L,B, m) is called
a probability lattice.
A Borel lattice is a Boolean σ-lattice (Birkhoff, 1967).
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Theorem 1 Let C ⊂ P⊗fin(H) be a Boolean lattice. If C is preconsistent with respect to the
state ̺, then the triple (P⊗fin(H), C, p̺) is a probability lattice, where p̺ is defined by
p̺ : C → R+, p̺(h) := d̺(h, h)
d̺(1C, 1C)
. (8)
The proof is straightforward.
In the literature it is often tacitly assumed that the preconsistent set of histories under
consideration forms (or generates) a Boolean lattice so that a probability interpretation of the
diagonal values of the decoherence functional makes sense.
The probability defined by Equation 8 can for finite homogeneous histories be interpreted as
conditional probability, namely as the probability of the sequence of the propositions htf =
htk , ..., htk−j given that the sequence of propositions htk−j−1 , ..., ht0 is realized.
Lemma 6 Let (P⊗fin(H), C, p̺) be a probability lattice, where p̺ is defined by Equation 8, then
for all h, k ∈ C
• 0 ≤ p̺(h) ≤ 1.
• p̺(h ∨ k) + p̺(h ∧ k) = p̺(h) + p̺(k).
• p̺(h) ≤ p̺(k) if h ≤ k.
Corollary 1 Let C ⊂ P⊗fin(H) be a Boolean lattice. Then C is a preconsistent set of histories
w.r.t. the state ̺ if and only if every pair h, k of histories in C satisfies
d̺(h ∨ k, h ∨ k) + d̺(h ∧ k, h ∧ k) = d̺(h, h) + d̺(k, k). (9)
Remark 8 We notice that d̺ induces also probability functionals on sets of histories which
are not Boolean lattices. Let C be a preconsistent set of pairwise disjoint histories, then m̺ :
C → R+, m̺(h) := d̺(h, h)/ (∑k∈C d̺(k, k)) is an additive functional on C and m̺(h) can be
interpreted as probability of h ∈ C. However, since C generates a Boolean sublattice of Kfin(H)
on which d̺ induces a probability measure extending m̺, it is enough to consider Boolean
algebras of histories.
3 The logical interpretation of quantum mechanics
The logical interpretation of (nonrelativistic) quantum mechanics is an epistemological inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics. This interpretation is mainly due to Roland Omne`s. In this
section we first briefly outline some basic assertions of the logical interpretation of quantum
mechanics. The logical interpretation as discussed in this section and Section 2 differs in some
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minor details from that in Omne`s’ original work (Omne`s, 1988a-c, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1994,
1995).
The logical interpretation is a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics and thus the dis-
cussion of Section 2 applies here, see in particular the first part of Section 2. In the logical
formulation the most general propositions about a quantum mechanical system which have
a physical meaning are identified with finite (or at least countably infinite) history proposi-
tions. Other statements about a system which cannot be casted into the framework of history
propositions are not considered to be meaningful and hence excluded from consideration. A
“probability” is associated with every history proposition in a consistent set. The set of all
probabilities for all history propositions specifies the state of the system. In the Hilbert space
formulation of quantum mechanics the state of a system is characterized by a density operator
and the probabilities are given by Equation 8. The set of all meaningful propositions about some
system in terms of histories together with their corresponding probabilities (given by Equation
8) is considered to be the most general conceivable knowledge about a particular quantum
mechanical system. The probabilities of histories are considered to be objective entities in their
own right, i.e., numbers associated with history propositions describing single systems, and not
only as quantities approximately equal to frequencies in a series of measurements. We adopt
again Popper’s propensity interpretation for this probabilities, compare Remark 2.
In our terminology introduced above the history propositions represent the (temporal) be-
ables (in the sense of propensities) and the probabilities are therefore thought to express the
(temporal) tendencies in the behaviour of the system. The probability measure on a consistent
Boolean algebra of history propositions induced by the decoherence functional according to
Theorem 1 defines in this consistent Boolean algebra two logical relations, namely an implica-
tion and an equivalence relation between histories. A history proposition h is said to imply a
history proposition k if the conditional probability p̺(k|h) ≡ p̺(h∧k)p̺(h) is well-defined and equal
to one. Two history propositions h and k are said to be equivalent if h implies k and vice
versa.
The universal rule of interpretation of quantum mechanics can now be formulated as
Rule 1 Propositions about quantum mechanical systems should solely be expressed in terms
of history propositions. Every description of an isolated quantum mechanical system should
be expressed in terms of finite history propositions belonging to a common consistent Boolean
algebra of histories. Every reasoning relating several propositions should be expressed in terms of
the logical relations induced by the probability measure from Theorem 1 in that Boolean algebra.
This logical rule has to be understood as a semantical rule which systematizes the language
of quantum mechanics. It once and for all makes sure, whether a reasoning or an implication
is allowed or not. This is exactly what one expects from a rule building the basis of a complete
interpretation. The logical rule can also be applied to the hitherto highly problematic retro-
dictive reasoning in quantum mechanics.
The causal relationship between different histories is coded into a logical relationship. This has
nothing to do with introducing ‘a new empirical kind of metalogic,’ as is sometimes claimed
(Zeh, n.d.), but simply introduces a convenient way of speaking: the logical rule is neither
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regarded as a scientific law of human thought nor intended to modify the logical structure of
our mathematical reasoning, but it is rather confined to the systems of quantum mechanical
propositions to which probabilities may be ascribed by the theory.
It should be noticed that in the above formulation there is neither a preferred history nor a
preferred Boolean algebra in the theory, which may be associated in some way with the ‘actual
facts’ observable in the real world. Omne`s does not claim to have solved the problem of actu-
alization of facts or the objectification problem in the quantum measurement process. On the
contrary, Omne`s argues in (Omne`s, 1992, 1994) that it is neither feasible nor necessary that
quantum mechanics provides an explanation for the process of actualization of facts. Therefore
the criticism in this direction raised by Zeh (n.d.) is unfounded.
A few remarks are in order here. Firstly, this author does neither claim nor presuppose
that quantum mechanics is the ultimate universal theory in terms of which every natural
phenomenon can eventually be described. This may or may not be the case. No conclusive
decision of this question can be made at the present.
Note 5 Some authors explicitly or implicitly postulate the universality of quantum mechanics
casted into the framework of consistent histories. According to this postulate the formalism
of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics (casted into the framework of consistent histories) can
without significant changes be applied to the whole universe and every (approximately) isolated
part of it. A globally defined notion of ‘time translation’ is needed simply to formulate such a
theory. However, in general curved spacetimes there is no such globally defined preferred notion
of ‘time translation.’ Thus this postulate needs further justification before it can be accepted
as a generally valid fundamental principle of physics. Intimately related to this question is the
question whether the notion of the initial state of the universe is meaningful at all. All these
nontrivial problems can presumably be decided only on the basis of a not yet existing quantum
theory of gravity.
Accordingly, we formulate the above Rule 1 modestly only for quantum mechanical systems,
i.e., systems which can indeed be described by quantum mechanics.
Secondly, in his work Omne`s identifies the possible ‘properties’ of a system at a fixed instant
of time with projection operators. As already discussed in Section 2 we do not use this termi-
nology in the present work.
Thirdly, Omne`s has a good deal to say about decoherence by the external environment, about
recovering classical physics and ‘common sense’ from his approach and about the notion of
truth in quantum mechanics and related questions. It is beyond the scope of the present work
to discuss these issues and thus the reader is referred to (Omne`s, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995;
Dowker and Kent, 1996; Zeh, n.d.). Concerning the notion of truth, we recall that in the
present work we adopt essentially Griffiths’ point of view (Griffiths, 1995).
Fourthly, it is sometimes claimed that in realistic and individual interpretations of quantum
mechanics it is possible to say that complementary physical qualities of a quantum system
have at every instant of time definite values (Popper, 1982). This claim can be shown to have
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paradoxical consequences and is indeed forbidden by Rule 1.
4 Generalization of the Consistent Histories Approach
4.1 Motivation
One drawback of the consistent histories formalism in its standard formulation is that the pos-
sible physical qualities of a physical system at any particular instant of time are restricted to
ordinary physical qualities represented by projection operators.
The introduction of histories is usually motivated by saying that everything that can meaning-
fully be said about a quantum mechanical system can be expressed in terms of time sequences of
one-time propositions about the system. As discussed above, in the usual formulation of quan-
tum mechanics one-time propositions are identified with one-time physical qualities, which are
represented by projection operators, so that histories are thought of as being correctly repre-
sented by time sequences of projection operators. However, as a matter of fact general physical
qualities in quantum mechanics have to be represented by effects. Projection operators repre-
sent only special physical qualities in quantum mechanics.
Omne`s asserts that the results of measurement theory can be deduced from the consistent
history approach. Similar assertions can also be found in (Griffiths, 1984). In particular, he ar-
gues that in a series of measurements of some proposition (represented by a projection operator
or a history proposition) the empirical frequencies of the results are approximately given by the
probabilities associated with that proposition. However, Omne`s restricts his discussion to a very
limited class of measurement situations, see Chapter 8 in (Omne`s, 1994). Firstly, he considers
only measurements of ordinary observables with discrete eigenvalue spectrum and secondly only
unitary measurement interactions which transform eigenstates of the measured observable into
eigenstates of the same eigenvalue. In the language of (Busch et al., 1991) Omne`s considers
only normal unitary von Neumann (pre-)measurements. However, the modern quantum theory
of measurement covers much more general measurement situations, specifically measurements
of generalized observables, see (Busch et al., 1991).
Note 6 It follows from a theorem by Ozawa (1984) that as a matter of principle the consistent history
approach in its standard formulation is unable to cover measurements of continuous observables. The
restriction of the discussion of measurement theory to ordinary discrete observables in (Omne`s, 1994)
is therefore not only a matter of convenience. Continuous observables can only be dealt with after
introducing a discrete reading scale. That is, continuous observables have to be replaced by discrete
coarse-grained observables. However, such a procedure does in general manifestly destroy invariance
properties of the continuous variables.
The interaction between the measurement apparatus and the measuring object in real mea-
surements usually takes place during a finite time interval and cannot be associated with a
fixed point of time. Further, many measurements have only a finite precision (‘unsharp mea-
surements’) and cannot be considered to be measurements of physical qualities represented by
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projection operators or to be sequences of measurements of physical qualities represented by
history propositions. As discussed by Ludwig (1983), Davies (1976), and by Busch, Lahti and
Mittelstaedt (1991) the physical quality measured in general measurement situations has to be
represented by some effect operator. However, the above formulated universal logical Rule 1
forbids to make predictions for or even to talk about results from such unsharp measurements
and also forbids to draw any conclusions from them. This state of affairs is clearly unsatis-
factory. Thus we feel that Omne`s’ logical rule has to be extended to cover also more realistic
measurement situations.
The question arises whether the logical interpretation can be generalized such that generalized
physical qualities can be dealt with and such that the more general measurement situations
can be described by the consistent history approach to quantum mechanics.
Since projection valued measures represent observables which can be measured ideally and
repeatedly (at least in principle) and since effect valued measures represent observables which
in general cannot be measured ideally and repeatedly, one might be tempted to reject this
argument and to argue apologetically that in the consistent history approach a quantum sys-
tem is described by (and only by) the set of its ‘properties’ (which are usually identified with
projection operators) which are asserted to be the fundamental ingredients in the description
of quantum systems. According to this line of thought other (unsharp) observables are not
fundamental and need thus not to be taken into account. However, we have already argued
against this attitude in Section 2 and will not repeat our arguments here. It has been pointed
out by Busch et al. (1989) that unsharp observables are ‘far from being mere imperfections’ and
that this point of view ‘amounts to a severe restriction of the measurement theoretic possibilities of
quantum mechanics. For instance one could not interpret the Stern-Gerlach experiment as a mea-
surement of a spin observable at all.’ Here of course a real Stern-Gerlach experiment is meant
and not one of its idealized textbook versions. The reader is referred to the lucid monograph
by Busch, Grabowski and Lahti (1995).
One may also argue that Naimark’s theorem (as stated, e.g., in (Busch et al., 1995)) implies
that only PV measures need to be taken into account since POV measures can be replaced
by PV measures on a larger Hilbert space H˜. [Naimark’s theorem states that every maximal
symmetric operator on a Hilbert space H is the restriction (to H) of some self-adjoint operator
on a larger Hilbert space H˜ ⊃ H.] However, the Hilbert space H˜ has in general no direct
physical interpretation, and even if it has, then it typically represents the environment of the
considered system or a measuring apparatus. In any case the PV measures on the Hilbert space
H˜ can in general not be interpreted as describing solely the system under consideration and
the projection operators in the range of the PV measures cannot in general be thought of as
representing properties of the system [e.g., when H˜ describes a measuring situation on H, then
typically the PV measures arising from POV measures on H represent pointer observables of
the measuring apparatus].
Therefore POV measures have to be considered as the observables in the theory and the question
of the status of generalized observables and of the corresponding generalized physical qualities
in the consistent history approach cannot be avoided.
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In summary of the above discussion we conclude that a generalization of the standard consistent
histories approach is needed for the following reasons: Firstly, the notion of observable in the stan-
dard consistent histories scheme is restricted to the class of ordinary observables and secondly, it is
not possible to describe realistic measurements in the language provided by the standard consistent
histories theory. It is the target of this section to generalize the consistent histories approach
appropriately and thereby get rid of these drawbacks. In the first part of this section we con-
struct the generalization of the consistent histories theory and of the logical interpretation for
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. At the end of this section we study the consequences of
our results for the structure of more general temporal history theories in the spirit of (Isham,
1994). In Section 5 below we will furthermore briefly argue that our generalized history ap-
proach incorporates in a natural way histories of ‘quasi-projectors’ and that we can dispose of
using approximate consistency conditions.
4.2 The Space of Effect Histories
As we have discussed above the equivalence classes of physical qualities of a system are the
objects in the theory which are interpreted to represent possible events of physical reality. Thus
in order to make pre- and retrodiction one has to study effect histories, i.e., sequences of effects
on H.
Definition 11 A homogeneous effect history is a map u : R → E(H), t 7→ ut. The
support of u is given by s(u) := {t ∈ R | ut 6= 1}. If s(u) is finite, countable or uncountable,
then we say that u is a finite, countable or uncountable effect history respectively.
The space of all homogeneous effect histories will be denoted by E(H), the space of all finite
homogeneous effect histories by Efin(H) and the space of all finite homogeneous effect histories
with support S by ES(H). All homogeneous effect histories for which there exists at least one
t ∈ R such that ut = 0 are collectively denoted by 0, slightly abusing the notation.
Remark 9 Let Gr be a finite set with r elements and supplied with two binary operations (free
meet and free join) which will be denoted by ∧fr and ∨fr respectively. Finite polynomials in
Gr can be built from elements of Gr by at most finitely many applications of ∧fr and ∨fr. On
the space of all finite polynomials in Gr a congruence relation is defined by imposing the algebraic
identities valid in every lattice, see (Birkhoff, 1967). The free lattice L(Gr) generated
by Gr is the quotient space of the space of all finite polynomials in Gr by this congruence
relation. Now let Gℵ be a set with ℵ elements, ℵ any cardinal number. The free lattice L(Gℵ)
generated by Gℵ can be constructed as follows: for any finite subset T ⊂ Gℵ one has constructed
L(T ). Let T and S be two finite subsets of Gℵ satisfying T ⊂ S, then the canonical embedding
ηTS : T → S can be extended to a monomorphism of free lattices η¯TS : L(T )→ L(S) (Birkhoff,
1967, Theorem VI.16). Define
L˜ := ⋃
T⊂Gℵ
T finite
L(T ).
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Two elements g1 ∈ L(T1) and g2 ∈ L(T2) (T1 and T2 finite) are equivalent if there is a
T12 ⊂ Gℵ such that T1 ⊂ T12 and T2 ⊂ T12 and η¯T1T12(g1) = η¯T2T12(g2). The free lattice
L(Gℵ) generated by Gℵ is now the quotient space of L˜ modulo this equivalence relation. It
is easy to show that the lattice operations on L(T ) induce the structure of a lattice on L(Gℵ).
The lattice operations on L(Gℵ) will be denoted by ∧L and ∨L. More information about free
lattices and free Boolean algebras can be found, e.g., in the monograph by Birkhoff (1967).
It is not clear at all how to define the meet and the join of two effect histories. Therefore
the notion of inhomogeneous effect history cannot be defined in a natural way compatible with
the partial ordering on E(H). But we can define
Definition 12 The free lattice generated by Efin(H) will be denoted by L (Efin(H)). The meet
and the join operations in L (Efin(H)) will be denoted by ∧L and ∨L respectively.
Remark 10 We can define a partial order on Efin(H). For u1, u2 ∈ Efin(H) we set u1 ≤ u2
if (u1)t ≤ (u2)t for all t ∈ R and say that u2 is coarser than u1. This partial ordering
induces partially defined meet and join operations (denoted by ∧ and ∨) on Efin(H). Every
finite polynomial in L (Efin(H)) can be transformed in equivalent polynomials by inserting
the identifications u1 ∨L u2 = u1 ∨ u2 and u1 ∧L u2 = u1 ∧ u2 whenever the right hand sides
are well-defined in Efin(H). This defines an equivalence relation ∼E on L (Efin(H)). It is
clear that the physically interesting objects are the ∼E-equivalence classes in the quotient space
L (Efin(H))/∼E. By construction ∼E is a congruence relation on L (Efin(H)). (For the notion
of congruence relation see, e.g., (Birkhoff, 1967; Skornjakov, 1977).) The ∼E-congruence class
of u ∈ Efin(H) will be denoted by ζ(u). For u ∈ A ⊂ L (Efin(H)) we write ζA(u) := {u′ ∈
A|u′ ∼E u} and ζ(A) := {ζ(a)|a ∈ A}.
Definition 13 The quotient space L (Efin(H))/∼E is called the space of finite inhomo-
geneous effect histories and will be denoted by Êfin(H). A finite inhomogeneous effect
history induces a map uˆ : R → L (E(H))/∼E, t 7→ ζ(u)t, but not vice versa. The support of
uˆ is given by s(uˆ) := {t ∈ R | uˆt 6= 1}. The space Ê(H) of general inhomogeneous ef-
fect histories and the space ÊS(H) of inhomogeneous effect histories with finite
support S are defined analogously.
For homogeneous finite effect histories u we define the class operator by
Ct0(u) := U(t0, tn)
√
utnU(tn, tn−1)
√
utn−1 ...U(t2, t1)
√
ut1U(t1, t0) (10)
= U(t0, ti(u))
√
utn(tn)
√
utn−1(tn−1)...
√
ut1(t1)U(ti(u), t0), (11)
where we have defined the Heisenberg picture operators
√
utk(tk) := U(tk, ti(u))
†√utkU(tk, ti(u))
with respect to the initial time ti(u) of u.
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For every pair u and v of finite homogeneous effect histories we define the decoherence
weight of u and v by
d̺(u, v) := tr
(
Ct0(u)̺(t0)Ct0(v)
†) . (12)
The functional d̺ : Efin(H)×Efin(H)→ C, (u, v) 7→ d̺(u, v) will be called the decoherence
functional associated with the state ̺. There immediately arises a serious difficulty
with this decoherence functional. At first sight it seems difficult (if not impossible) to construct
a natural mathematical structure on the space of effect histories such that the decoherence func-
tional is additive in both arguments. Without this structure a consistency condition generalizing
Equation 9 cannot even be formulated and an interpretation of d̺(u, u) as probability seems
to be impossible. (We will see below that the decoherence functional induces a probability
functional on some sets of effect histories on which the decoherence functional is not additive.)
These questions are investigated in the next subsection.
Note 7 It is straightforward to generalize the notion of linearly positive history introduced by Goldstein
and Page (1995) and to introduce linearly positive effect histories and the like. However, since the
physical significance of the Goldstein-Page condition remains somewhat elusive, we will not consider
it in this work.
4.3 Consistent Effect Histories and the Generalized Logical Rule of
Interpretation
Isham (1994) has studied the logico-algebraic structure of the standard consistent histories
approach and has discussed generalizations of this structure as models for more general history
theories which may have applications to quantum space-time theories. It is the aim of this
subsection to discuss this line of thought from the point of view of our generalized histories
involving effects and to use our results to generalize the logical interpretation to the present
framework. We start with some important definitions
Definition 14 A difference poset or D-poset is a partially ordered set D with greatest
element 1 and with a partial binary operation ⊖ : D2 → D, where D2 ⊂ D ×D, such that
• b⊖ a is defined if and only if a ≤ b for all a, b ∈ D,
• b⊖ a ≤ b for all a ≤ b,
• b⊖ (b⊖ a) = a, for all a ≤ b,
• a ≤ b ≤ c⇒ c⊖ b ≤ c⊖ a and (c⊖ a)⊖ (c⊖ b) = b⊖ a.
Difference posets have been introduced by Koˆpka and Chovanec (1994) and have been
further studied in (Koˆpka, 1992; Dvurecˇenskij and Pulmannova´ 1994a-c; Dvurecˇenskij 1995;
Pulmannova´, 1995).
Definition 15 A set D with two special elements 0, 1 ∈ D supplied with a partially defined
associative and commutative operation ⊕ : D′2 → D, where D′2 ⊂ D ×D, is called an effect
algebra if
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• For every a ∈ D there exists a unique a′ ∈ D such that a⊕ a′ is defined and a⊕ a′ = 1,
• If 1⊕ b is defined, then b = 0, for all b ∈ D.
An effect algebra D is called an orthoalgebra if furthermore
• If b⊕ b is defined, then b = 0, for all b ∈ D.
Effect algebras have been introduced by Foulis and Bennett (1994). Whenever a ⊕ b is
well-defined for a, b ∈ D, then we write a ⊥ b. Let (D,⊖) be a D-poset. Define
a⊕ b := 1⊖ ((1⊖ a)⊖ b),
whenever the right hand side is well-defined. Then ⊕ is a well-defined partial binary operation
on D and (D,⊕) is an effect algebra. Conversely, let (D,⊕) be an effect algebra. Define
b⊖ a := (a⊕ b′)′,
whenever the right hand side is well-defined. Then ⊖ is a well-defined partially binary operation
on D. Further, define a ≤ b for a, b ∈ D if there exists c ∈ D such that c ⊥ a and a ⊕ c = b.
Then (D,⊖) is a D-poset. Therefore the notions of D-poset and effect algebra are equivalent
and we will use both terms synonymously in the following.
Definition 16 A finite subset {a1, a2, ..., an} of a D-poset (D,⊕) is said to be⊕-orthogonal
if
⊕n
i=1 ai := a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ an can be defined recursively. In this case
⊕n
i=1 ai is called the⊕
-sum of {a1, a2, ..., an}. In particular, for every n ∈ N, we define an := na := ⊕ni=1 a, for all
a ∈ D for which the right hand side is well-defined. A ⊕-orthogonal subset {a1, a2, ..., an}
of a D-poset D is said to be complete if
⊕n
i=1 ai = 1. The family of all
⊕
-sums of subsets of
{a1, a2, ..., an} will be denoted by ⊕{a1, a2, ..., an}.
Furthermore, let D0 ⊂ D, then the set of all well-defined finite ⊕-sums of elements of D0 will
be denoted by
⊕
D0.
Since ⊕ is commutative and associative, ⊕ni=1 ai is indeed well-defined.
Remark 11 If {a1, a2, ..., an} is a finite, complete, ⊕-orthogonal subset of a D-poset (D,⊕),
then (
⊕{a1, a2, ..., an},⊕) is itself a D-poset.
Remark 12 The set E(H) of all effect operators on a Hilbert space H [with the scalar product
denoted by (·, ·)] can be organized into a D-poset by defining a partial ordering and a partial
binary operation ⊖ on D by A ≤ B if (Ax, x) ≤ (Bx, x) for all x ∈ H and C = B ⊖ A if
(Bx, x)− (Ax, x) = (Cx, x) for all x ∈ H.
Definition 17 Let (D,⊕) be a D-poset. A probability measure on D is a map p : D → R+
satisfying p(1) = 1 and p(a⊕ b) = p(a) + p(b), whenever a⊕ b is well-defined.
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We next summarize the general axioms for a generalized quantum theory based on histo-
ries as stated by Isham (1994). According to Isham the algebraic structure underlying the
generalized quantum mechanics of histories consists of the following ingredients:
1. The space of history propositions U.
• Isham and Linden (1994) suggest that the minimal useful mathematical structure
on U is that of an orthoalgebra. One may also consider the case that U is an ortho-
complemented lattice or has an even stronger structure (e.g., a complete orthocom-
plemented lattice). (Pulmannova´ (1995) proposed that the space of all histories in
a generalized quantum theory may admit the structure of a D-poset. In the present
work a physical justification of this proposal is given.)
2. The space of decoherence functionals.
A decoherence functional is a map d : U× U→ C which satisfies for all α, α′, β ∈ U
• d(α, α) ∈ R and d(α, α) ≥ 0.
• d(α, β) = d(β, α)∗.
• d(1, 1) = 1.
• d(0, α) = 0, for all α.
• – If U is an orthoalgebra (or more generally an effect algebra), then d(α1⊕α2, β) =
d(α1, β) + d(α2, β) for all α1, α2, β ∈ U with α1 ⊥ α2.
– If U is a lattice, then d(α1 ∨ α2, β) = d(α1, β) + d(α2, β)− d(α1 ∧ α2, β) for all
α1, α2, β ∈ U.
3. The physical interpretation of the above axioms is the same as in the case of the stan-
dard consistent history formulation. One can define (pre)consistent sets of histories and
interpret d(α, α) as the probability of the history α.
Besides the structures of the space of histories and the space of decoherence functionals
which are believed to be present also in more general history theories than nonrelativistic
quantum mechanics, Isham (1994) also describes structures arising in the history formu-
lation of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics which may be an artefact of that theory and
may be meaningless in more general quantum history theories.
4. The space U of history filters or homogeneous histories.
• U is a partial semigroup with composition law ◦. It satisfies α ◦ 1 = α and α ◦ 0 = 0
for all α ∈ U . If α ◦ β is defined, then α ◦ β = α ∧ β.
• U is a partially ordered set with a unit 1 and a null history 0. The partial order is
denoted by ≤.
• On U an operation of meet, denoted by ∧, is defined which satisfies 1 ∧ α = α and
0 ∧ α = 0 for all α ∈ U .
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• There exists an embedding τ : U → U, i.e., τ(U) ⊂ U.
• U can be generated from U by the application of a finite or countably infinite number
of the algebraic operations defined on U.
Clearly, the axioms for U have to be modified when taking into account homogeneous
effect histories. We will return to this point below. The definition of a semigroup will
also be given below.
5. The space of temporal supports S.
• S is a partial semigroup with unit.
• There exists a semigroup homomorphism κ : U → S such that κ(1) = κ(0) = 1 ∈ S.
S may contain only one element S = {1}.
In the standard history approach to quantum mechanics we have the following identifica-
tions: S is the space of all finite subsets of R and U := Hfin(H). Isham’s axioms, as stated
above, are not the most general structure possible. There is great freedom to add further axioms
to the list or to remove some (note that we have already omitted some of Isham’s axioms). As
discussed in Section 2, finite homogeneous histories can be identified with projection operators
on ⊗t∈SH in a natural way. One aim of this subsection is to examine to what extent Isham’s
results can be extended to our generalized effect histories and to explore its consequences for
more general history theories. To this end the concept of the tensor product of effect algebras
is of utmost importance. The tensor product of a pair of D-posets is defined by a universal
mapping property, cf. (Dvurecˇenskij, 1995).
Definition 18 Let D1, D2, ..., Dn and L denote D-posets.
• A mapping φ : D1 → L is said to be a morphism if (i) φ(1) = 1, (ii) a ⊥ b implies
φ(a) ⊥ φ(b) and φ(a⊕ b) = φ(a)⊕ φ(b), for all a, b ∈ D1.
• A mapping φ : D1 → L is said to be a monomorphism if (i) φ is a morphism and (ii)
φ(a) ⊥ φ(b) implies a ⊥ b, for all a, b ∈ D1.
• A mapping φ : D1 → L is said to be an isomorphism if φ is a surjective monomorphism.
• A mapping θ : D1 ×D2 → L is said to be a semi-bimorphism if
– a, b ∈ D1 with a ⊥ b imply θ(a, c) ⊥ θ(b, c) and θ(a ⊕ b, c) = θ(a, c)⊕ θ(b, c) for all
c ∈ D2;
– c, d ∈ D2 with c ⊥ d imply θ(a, c) ⊥ θ(a, d) and θ(a, c⊕ d) = θ(a, c)⊕ θ(a, d) for all
a ∈ D1;
• A mapping θ : D1 ×D2 → L is said to be a bimorphism if it is a semi-bimorphism and
θ(1, 1) = 1.
25
• A mapping θ : D1 × D2 × · · · × Dn → L is said to be a multimorphism if it is a
semi-bimorphism in every pair of its arguments and if θ(1, ..., 1) = 1.
Definition 19 Let D1, ..., Dn denote a family of n D-posets. We say that a pair (D,Θ) con-
sisting of a D-poset D and a multimorphism Θ : D1 × · · · ×Dn → D is a tensor product
of the family D1, ..., Dn if the following conditions are satisfied
• If L is a D-poset and θL : D1 × · · · × Dn → L a multimorphism, then there exists a
morphism β : D→ L such that θL = β ◦Θ;
• Every element of D is a finite orthogonal sum of elements of the form Θ(a1, ..., an) with
ai ∈ Di, for all i.
We also write D =
⊗n
i=1Di = D1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Dn and Θ = ⊗.
Dvurecˇenskij (1995) has proven that two D-posets D1 and D2 admit a tensor product if and
only if there is a difference poset L for which there is a bimorphism θL : D1 × D2 → L. The
definition of the tensor product of D-posets and Dvurecˇenskij’s theorem can straightforwardly
be extended to any finite number of D-posets, see (Pulmannova´, 1995).
Let in the sequel N denote the set of positive integers including 0. We adopt the following
definitions
Definition A set Ω with an operation ⊤ : Ω × Ω → Ω is called a semigroup if the asso-
ciative law is satisfied.
Definition A triple (Ω,⊤,⊙) is called a semiring if
• (Ω,⊤) is an abelian semigroup with neutral element,
• (Ω,⊙) is a semigroup with unit 1,
• the distributive laws are satisfied.
Example: Let α ∈ R+\{0} and define Nα := {nα|n ∈ N}. A semigroup operation +α :
Nα × Nα → Nα is defined by u+α v :=
(
u1/α + v1/α
)α
. Further, define ⊙α : Nα × Nα → Nα by
u⊙αv :=
(
u1/α · v1/α
)α
= u · v. Then the triple (Nα,+α,⊙α) is a semiring. For all α ∈ R+\{0}
there is a semiring isomorphism ια : Nα →֒ N, ια(u) := u1/α. We call (Nα,+α,⊙α) the semiring
of α-scaled natural numbers.
Definition Let (M,+) be an abelian semigroup and (Ω,+,⊙) be a semiring and · : Ω×M →M
be a ‘scalar multiplication.’ Then the system (M,+;Ω,⊙; ·) is called a semimodule over the
semiring (Ω,+,⊙) if for all ω, ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω and m,m1, m2 ∈M
• ω · (m1 +m2) = ω ·m1 + ωm2,
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• (ω1 + ω2) ·m = ω1 ·m+ ω2 ·m,
• (ω1 ⊙ ω2) ·m = ω1 · (ω2 ·m),
• 1 ·m = m.
Consider now two complex Hilbert spaces H1 and H2 and the corresponding sets of effects
E(H1) and E(H2). An immediate consequence of Dvurecˇenskij’s theorem is that the tensor
product of E(H1) and E(H2) exists. To gain insight into the structure of the space of effect
histories it is necessary to explicitly construct the tensor product of E(H1) and E(H2). To this
end we regard H1 as right semimodule over N and H2 as left semimodule over N and denote by
H1 ⊗N H2 the tensor product of the N-semimodules H1 and H2 in the category of semimodules
over N , that is, H1 ⊗N H2 is the free abelian semigroup generated by elements of the form
ψ ⊗N ϕ with ψ ∈ H1 and ϕ ∈ H2 subject to the relations
1. (ψ1 + ψ2)⊗N ϕ = (ψ1 ⊗N ϕ) + (ψ2 ⊗N ϕ), for all ψ1, ψ2 ∈ H1 and ϕ ∈ H2;
2. ψ ⊗N (ϕ1 + ϕ2) = (ψ ⊗N ϕ1) + (ψ ⊗N ϕ2), for all ψ ∈ H1 and ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ H2;
3. n(ψ ⊗N ϕ) ≡ (ψn)⊗N ϕ = ψ ⊗N (nϕ), for all ψ ∈ H1, ϕ ∈ H2 and n ∈ N.
To every E1 ∈ E(H1) and E2 ∈ E(H2) one can define a map H1 ⊗N H2 → H1 ⊗N H2 by
E1 ⊗N E2(ψ ⊗N ϕ) := E1ψ ⊗N E2ϕ.
E(H1) and E(H2) can also be regarded as right and left N-semimodules respectively. We can
thus consider the tensor product E(H1) ⊗N E(H2) of E(H1) and E(H2) in the category of N-
semimodules. E(H1)⊗N E(H2) is the free abelian semigroup generated by elements of the form
E1 ⊗N E2, where E1 ∈ E(H1) and E2 ∈ E(H2) subject to the relations
1. n(E1 ⊗N E2) ≡ (E1n)⊗N E2 = E1 ⊗N (nE2), for all E1 ∈ E(H1), E2 ∈ E(H2) and n ∈ N;
2. (E1 ⊗N E2) + (E1 ⊗N E˜2) = E1 ⊗N (E2 + E˜2), for all E1 ∈ E(H1) and E2, E˜2 ∈ E(H2);
3. (E1 ⊗N E2) + (E˜1 ⊗N E2) = (E1 + E˜1)⊗N E2, for all E1, E˜1 ∈ E(H1) and E2 ∈ E(H2).
The scalar products on H1 and H2 allow to define a scalar product on H1 ⊗N H2 given by
〈Φ | A | Ψ〉 := 〈φ | E1 | ψ〉〈ω | E2 | ϕ〉, if Φ = φ⊗N ω,Ψ = ψ ⊗N ϕ ∈ H1 ⊗N H2
and A = E1 ⊗N E2 ∈ E(H1)⊗N E(H2).
This ’scalar product’ is extended by linearity to arbitrary A ∈ E(H1) ⊗N E(H2) and Φ,Ψ ∈
H1⊗NH2. A partial order on E(H1)⊗N E(H2) can now be defined. For A,B ∈ E(H1)⊗N E(H2)
we set A ≤ B if 〈Ψ | A | Ψ〉 ≤ 〈Ψ | B | Ψ〉 for all Ψ ∈ H1 ⊗N H2.
A finite family {Ei ⊗N Fi}i of elements of E(H1) ⊗N E(H2) is a decomposition of 1 ⊗N 1 if∑
iEi ⊗N Fi = 1⊗N 1 in E(H1)⊗N E(H2).
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In order to establish the effect algebra structure on E(H1) ⊗N E(H2) we define a partial
binary operation ⊕N on E(H1)⊗N E(H2) by
A⊕N B := A +B, if A +B ≤ 1,
for all A,B ∈ E(H1)⊗N E(H2). However, (E(H1)⊗N E(H2),⊕N) is not yet the tensor product
of E(H1) and E(H2). Indeed, (E(H1)⊗N E(H2),⊕N) is not even a D-poset.
We next define another partial binary operation ⊕D on E(H1) ⊗N E(H2). We say that a ⊕D-
sum of the form (E1 ⊗N F1) ⊕D (E2 ⊗N F2) ⊕D · · · ⊕D (En ⊗N Fn) of finitely many elements
Ei ⊗N Fi ∈ E(H1) ⊗N E(H2) exists if there exists a decomposition ⊕N,i ei ⊗N fi of 1 ⊗N 1 in
E(H1) ⊗N E(H2) such that every term of the form Ei ⊗N Fi occurs also in the decomposition⊕
N,i∈I ei ⊗N fi of 1 ⊗N 1, i.e., if there for every i ∈ {1, ..., n} there exists a j ∈ I such that
Ei ⊗N Fi = ej ⊗N fj .
In this case we also adopt the following way of speaking: we say that the ⊕D-sum (E1⊗NF1)⊕D
(E2 ⊗N F2)⊕D · · · ⊕D (En ⊗N Fn) is a ⊕D-part of 1⊗N 1.
In this case we set
(E1 ⊗N F1)⊕D (E2 ⊗N F2)⊕D · · · ⊕D (En ⊗N Fn) := (E1 ⊗N F1)⊕N (E2 ⊗N F2)⊕N · · · ⊕N (En ⊗N Fn).
(13)
We further say that a ⊕D-sum (E1 ⊗N F1)⊕D (E2 ⊗N F2)⊕D · · · ⊕D (En ⊗N Fn) is a minimal
representation of its associated ⊕D-part of 1⊗N 1 if the number of terms in the sum cannot
be reduced by applying the defining relations 1., 2. and 3. of E(H1)⊗N E(H2) (see above).
The ⊕D-sum Gα ⊕D Gβ of two arbitrary elements Gα and Gβ ∈ E(H1) ⊗N E(H2) is defined if
Gα possesses a well-defined decomposition
Gα = (Eα1 ⊗N Fα1)⊕D · · · ⊕D (Eαn ⊗N Fαn),
and if Gβ possesses a well-defined decomposition
Gβ = (Eβ1 ⊗N Fβ1)⊕D · · · ⊕D (Eβm ⊗N Fβm),
(i.e., Gα and Gβ are both well-defined ⊕D-parts of 1⊗N 1) such that
(Gα⊕DGβ) := (Eα1 ⊗N Fα1)⊕D · · · ⊕D (Eαn ⊗N Fαn)⊕D (Eβ1 ⊗N Fβ1)⊕D · · · ⊕D (Eβm ⊗N Fβm)
is well-defined. It is clear that (Gα ⊕D Gβ) such defined is independent of the particular
decompositions considered. We say that two ⊕D-parts of 1⊗N1, say, Gδ andGγ are equivalent
if for all ⊕D-parts G of 1⊗N 1 the following holds: G⊕DGδ is well-defined and equal to 1⊗N 1
if and only if G⊕DGγ is well-defined and equal to 1⊗N 1. We also write Gδ ∼D Gγ . We write
for the ∼D-equivalence class of G either [G] or (abusing the notation) simply G. It is clear that
the equivalence class of a homogeneous element E⊗N F contains only the element E⊗N F , i.e.,
[E⊗N F ] = {E⊗N F}. The partial addition ⊕D defined above for ⊕D-parts of 1⊗N 1 induces a
partial addition on the equivalence classes of ⊕D-parts of 1⊗N 1 (denoted by the same symbol)
by
[Gδ]⊕D [Gγ ] := [Gδ ⊕DGγ ] ,
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for all Gδ and Gγ for which the right hand side is well-defined. It is clear that every equivalence
class [G] contains at most two elements. Further, if [G] contains more than one element, then
the complementary class [G]′ := [G′] of [G] (defined by [G] ⊕D [G]′ = [1]) contains only one
element but not vice versa. For well-defined ⊕D-parts G ∈ E(H1) ⊗N E(H2) of 1 ⊗N 1 with a
minimal representation of the form G = (E1⊗NF1)⊕D(E2⊗NF2)⊕D · · ·⊕D(En⊗NFn) there are
two candidates both of which may serve as complements in case they are well-defined, namely
• G∗ := (E1 ⊗N (1− F1))⊕D (E2 ⊗N (1− F2))⊕D · · · ⊕D (En ⊗N (1− Fn))⊕D
⊕D ((1− (E1 ⊕ E2 ⊕ · · · ⊕En))⊗N 1)
• G∗∗ := ((1− E1)⊗N F1)⊕D ((1−E2)⊗N F2)⊕D · · · ⊕D ((1−En)⊗N Fn)⊕D
⊕D (1⊗N (1− (F1 ⊕ F2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Fn))) .
However, if G is well-defined, it is clear that either G∗ or G∗∗ is well-defined. (If they are both
well-defined, then they are equivalent of course since also G ⊕D G∗ and G ⊕D G∗∗ are both
well-defined and equal to 1 ⊗N 1.) Define E(H1)⊗̂DE(H2) as the effect algebra with partial
binary operation ⊕D as the set consisting of all ∼D-equivalence classes of well-defined finite
⊕D-sums G of elements of the form E1⊗̂DE2 := E1⊗N E2 ∈ E(H1)⊗N E(H2), i.e., consisting of
all ∼D-equivalence classes of ⊕D-parts of 1⊗N 1, subject to the relations
1. n(E1⊗̂DE2) = (nE1)⊗̂DE2 = E1⊗̂D(nE2), for all E1 ∈ E(H1), E2 ∈ E(H2) and n ∈ N,
whenever the expressions are well-defined;
2. (E1⊗̂DE2)⊕D (E1⊗̂DE˜2) = E1⊗̂D(E2 ⊕ E˜2), for all E1 ∈ E(H1) and E2, E˜2 ∈ E(H2),
whenever the expressions are well-defined;
3. (E1⊗̂DE2)⊕D (E˜1⊗̂DE2) = (E1 ⊕ E˜1)⊗̂DE2, for all E1, E˜1 ∈ E(H1) and E2 ∈ E(H2),
whenever the expressions are well-defined.
Theorem 2 The pair (E(H1)⊗̂DE(H2),⊕D) is the tensor product of E(H1) and E(H2).
Proof: That every element G of E(H1)⊗̂DE(H2) is a finite ⊕D-orthogonal sum of elements of
the form E1⊗NE2 with E1 ∈ E(H1) and E2 ∈ E(H2) and that to every G ∈ E(H1)⊗̂DE(H2) there
is a unique G∗ ∈ E(H1)⊗̂DE(H2) such that G⊕DG∗ = 1⊗N 1 ∈ E(H1)⊗̂DE(H2) is clear by con-
struction. Let ((D, ⊕̂D); Θ) denote the tensor product of E(H1) and E(H2). Then there exists
a morphism θ : D→ E(H1)⊗̂DE(H2) such that ⊗̂D = θ ◦ Θ. Every element in E(H1)⊗̂DE(H2)
is an equivalence class of ⊕D-parts of decompositions of 1 ⊗N 1 ∈ E(H1)⊗̂DE(H2). The map
Θ ◦ ⊗̂−1
D
: ⊗̂D (E(H1)× E(H2)) → D maps the collection of all homogeneous terms (i.e., those
of the form ei⊗N fj) in every particular decomposition of 1⊗N 1 to a complete, ⊕̂D-orthogonal
subset of D. Thus Θ ◦ ⊗̂−1
D
can be extended to a map which maps every equivalence class of
⊕D-parts of 1 ⊗N 1 to a ⊕̂D-part of 1D = Θ ◦ ⊗̂−1D (1 ⊗N 1). We denote this extension also by
Θ◦⊗̂−1
D
. Since then θ◦Θ◦⊗̂−1
D
= id
E(H1)⊗̂DE(H2), it follows that θ is surjective. We show that θ is
also injective. To this end consider d1, d2 ∈ D, such that θ(d1) = θ(d2). θ(d1) and θ(d2) are both
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equivalence classes of ⊕D-parts of ⊗̂D(1, 1). Thus Θ ◦ ⊗̂−1D (θ(d1)) = Θ ◦ ⊗̂−1D (θ(d2)). Since D is
a D-poset, d1 and d2 are ⊕̂D-sums of elements of the form di1 = Θ(ei11, ei12) and dj2 = Θ(ej21, ej22),
i.e., d1 = ⊕̂Ddi1 = ⊕̂DΘ(ei11, ei12) and d2 = ⊕̂Ddj2 = ⊕̂DΘ(ej21, ej22). With θ ◦ Θ = ⊗̂D it follows
Θ ◦ ⊗̂−1D (θ(di1)) = di1 and thus Θ ◦ ⊗̂−1D (θ(d1)) = d1 and similarly Θ ◦ ⊗̂−1D (θ(d2)) = d2. Thus
d1 = d2. It follows from the above argument that θ
−1 is also a morphism. Thus θ is an isomor-
phism between D-posets and therefore (D, ⊕̂D) = (E(H1)⊗̂DE(H2),⊕D). ✷
This result can immediately be generalized to the tensor product of finitely many such effect
algebras. With an obvious generalization of our above notation we have
Corollary 2 The pair (E(H1)⊗̂DE(H2)⊗̂D· · · ⊗̂DE(Hn),⊕D) is the tensor product of the family
E(H1), ...,E(Hn).
In the sequel we denote by Θ the map defined in the proof of Theorem 2 given by
Θ : E(H1)× · · · × E(Hn)→ E(H1)⊗̂D · · · ⊗̂DE(Hn),Θ(ut1, ..., utn) := ut1⊗̂D · · · ⊗̂Dutn .
Remember that the equivalence class Θ(ut1 , ..., utn) contains only the element ut1⊗̂D · · · ⊗̂Dutn .
However, general equivalence classes [G] ∈ E(H1)⊗̂D · · · ⊗̂DE(Hn) contain at most n! elements.
Now we consider homogeneous effect histories with fixed finite support S = {t1, ..., tn}. The
set of all such histories can be identified with the Cartesian product E(H)t1×· · ·×E(H)tn . The
class operator defined by Equation 10 factorizes according to
u = (ut1 , ..., utn)
Θ−→ Θ(u) = ut1⊗̂D···⊗̂Dutn
√
−→
√
Θ(u) = u
1/2
t1 ⊗̂D···⊗̂Du
1/2
tn
C′t0−→ C ′t0
(√
Θ(u)
)
= Ct0(u),
where C ′t0 is defined in an obvious way.
We define a decoherence functional d̺̂,S for pairs (a, b) of homogeneous elements in
(E(H)t1 ⊗N · · · ⊗N E(H)tn)× (E(H)t1 ⊗N · · · ⊗N E(H)tn) by
d̺̂,S(a, b) := tr
(
C ′t0
(√
a
)
̺C ′t0
(√
b
)†)
. (14)
The such defined decoherence functional cannot be extended to a ⊕D-additive functional on(
E(H)t1⊗̂D · · · ⊗̂DE(H)tn
)
×
(
E(H)t1⊗̂D · · · ⊗̂DE(H)tn
)
, that is, the D-poset structure given by
⊕D is not the physically interesting one.
The decoherence functional d̺̂,S can easily be extended to arbitrary finite homogeneous effect
histories
d̺,N : Efin(H)× Efin(H)→ C, d̺,N(u, v) := d̺̂,s(u)∪s(v) (Θ(u),Θ(v)) ,
for all u, v ∈ Efin(H).
However, before we proceed to define and investigate the algebraic structure in terms of
which the general consistency condition in our generalized history theory can be formulated,
we briefly mention that there exist special sets of effect histories on which the decoherence
functional induces a probability measure even though in general none of the familiar consistency
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conditions is satisfied for the elements of the special sets.
To this end fix an arbitrary finite homogeneous effect history u0, fix a t
∗ > tf(u0) and for every
E ∈ E(H) denote by uE the finite homogeneous effect history defined by s(uE) := s(u0) ∪ {t∗}
and by
(uE)t :=
{
(u0)t : t 6= t∗
E : t = t∗
,
that is, uE is the extension of u0 by the effect E. The above decoherence functional d̺̂,s(u0)∪{t∗}
induces a probability measure on the set E˜ := {uE | E ∈ E(H)} ≃ E(H) by
p̺ : E˜→ R, p̺(uE) := d̺̂,s(u0)∪{t∗} (Θ(uE),Θ(uE)) . (15)
The D-poset structure on E(H) induces a D-poset structure on E˜. It is easy to see that p̺ is
additive on E˜ in the sense p̺(uE1⊕E2) = p̺(uE1) + p̺(uE2), whenever E1 ⊕ E2 is well-defined.
We will say that the D-poset of histories E˜ which can be constructed in this way (and which
in particular is isomorphic to E(H)) is a full D-poset of effect histories. If E and F
are orthogonal projection operators, then d̺̂,s(u0)∪{t∗}(Θ(uE),Θ(uF )) = 0. However, if E and
F are not orthogonal projection operators, then in general Re d̺̂,s(u0)∪{t∗}(Θ(uE),Θ(uF )) 6= 0.
The probability p̺(uE) can be interpreted as the conditional probability that the event E will
be realized at time t∗ given that the history u0 is realized. Stated differently, the probability
of the history uE in the state ̺ equals the probability of the effect E in the (reduced) state
Ct0(u0)̺Ct0(u0)
†, i.e., p̺(uE) = pCt0(u0)̺Ct0 (u0)†(E).
We mention already here that it is possible to construct further exceptional D-posets of effect
histories such that the decoherence functional is additive in both arguments. We will return to
this point below.
We now return to our determination and investigation of the natural algebraic structure
which makes the decoherence functional additive in both arguments.
It is possible to define a tensor product E(H)t1⊗˜D · · · ⊗˜DE(H)tn such that the corresponding
decoherence functional d̺,S is additive in both arguments as we will show next. To this end we
again consider E(H1)⊗N E(H2) and define a partial binary operation ⊕˜N by
A⊕˜NB :=
(
A1/2 +B1/2
)2
, if A1/2 +B1/2 ≤ 1, (16)
for all homogeneous elements A = A1⊗NA2, B = B1⊗NB2 ∈ E(H1)⊗N E(H2). Finite ⊕˜N-sums
of homogeneous elements are defined recursively and the set of all well-defined finite ⊕˜N-sums of
homogeneous elements will be denoted by E(H1)⊗¯NE(H2). Notice that A⊕˜NB is a well-defined
bounded, linear operator on H1 ⊗N H2, but in general A⊕˜NB /∈ E(H1)⊗N E(H2).
We have defined above a partial operation ⊖ on the space E(H) of effect operators on the
Hilbert space H such that (E(H),⊖) is a D-poset. However, the D-poset structure on E(H) is
not unique. Define A⊕˜B :=
(
A1/2 +B1/2
)2
, for all A,B ∈ E(H) satisfying A1/2+B1/2 ≤ 1. To
prove that (E(H), ⊕˜) is a D-poset is straightforward. Moreover, (E(H), ⊕˜) is an N2-semimodule.
In this work we denote the D-poset (E(H),⊕) briefly by E(H). When we refer to E(H) supplied
with the D-poset structure given by ⊕˜, then we explicitly write (E(H), ⊕˜).
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We can now proceed as above and define a partial binary operation ⊕˜D and construct the tensor
product of (E(H1), ⊕˜) and (E(H2), ⊕˜) in the category of N2-semimodules. Everywhere in our
above description of the definition of ⊕D preceding Theorem 2 we simply have to replace
• ⊕ by ⊕˜;
• ⊕N by ⊕˜N;
• ⊕D by ⊕˜D;
• ∼D by ≈D.
We say that a ⊕˜D-sum of the form (E1 ⊗N F1)⊕˜D(E2 ⊗N F2)⊕˜D · · · ⊕˜D(En ⊗N Fn) of finitely many elements
Ei⊗NFi ∈ E(H1)⊗NE(H2) exists if there exists a decomposition
⊕˜
N,iei ⊗N fi of 1⊗N 1 in E(H1)⊗¯NE(H2) such
that every term of the form Ei⊗N Fi occurs also in the decomposition
⊕˜
N,i∈Iei⊗N fi of 1⊗N 1, i.e., if there for
every i ∈ {1, ..., n} there exists a j ∈ I such that Ei ⊗N Fi = ej ⊗N fj.
In this case we also adopt the following way of speaking: we say that the ⊕˜D-sum (E1⊗NF1)⊕˜D(E2⊗NF2)⊕˜D ·
· · ⊕˜D(En⊗NFn) is a ⊕˜D-part of 1⊗N1.
In this case we set
(E1⊗NF1)⊕˜D(E2⊗NF2)⊕˜D · · · ⊕˜D(En⊗NFn) := (E1⊗NF1)⊕˜N(E2⊗NF2)⊕˜N · · · ⊕˜N(En⊗NFn). (17)
We further say that a ⊕˜D-sum (E1⊗NF1)⊕˜D(E2⊗NF2)⊕˜D · · · ⊕˜D(En⊗NFn) is a minimal representation of
its associated ⊕˜D-part of 1⊗N 1 if the number of terms in the sum cannot be reduced by applying the following
relations
1. n(E1⊗NE2) ≡ (nE1)⊗NE2 = E1⊗N(nE2), for all E1 ∈ (E(H1), ⊕˜), E2 ∈ (E(H2), ⊕˜) and n ∈ N2.
whenever the expressions are well-defined;
2. (E1⊗NE2)⊕˜D(E1⊗NE˜2) = E1⊗N(E2⊕˜E˜2), for all E1 ∈ (E(H1), ⊕˜) and E2, E˜2 ∈ (E(H2), ⊕˜),
whenever the expressions are well-defined;
3. (E1⊗NE2)⊕˜D(E˜1⊗NE2) = (E1⊕˜E˜1)⊗NE2, for all E1, E˜1 ∈ (E(H1), ⊕˜) and E2 ∈ (E(H2), ⊕˜),
whenever the expressions are well-defined.
The ⊕˜D-sum (Gα⊕˜DGβ) of two arbitrary elements Gα and Gβ ∈ E(H1)⊗¯NE(H2) is defined if Gα possesses a
well-defined decomposition
Gα = (Eα1⊗NFα1)⊕˜D · · · ⊕˜D(Eαn⊗NFαn),
and if Gβ possesses a well-defined decomposition
Gβ = (Eβ1⊗NFβ1)⊕˜D · · · ⊕˜D(Eβm⊗NFβm),
(i.e., Gα and Gβ are both well-defined ⊕˜D-parts of 1⊗N 1) such that
(Gα⊕˜DGβ) := (Eα1⊗NFα1)⊕˜D · · · ⊕˜D(Eαn⊗NFαn)⊕˜D(Eβ1⊗NFβ1)⊕˜D · · · ⊕˜D(Eβm⊗NFβm) (18)
is well-defined. It is clear that (Gα⊕˜DGβ) such defined is independent of the particular decompositions con-
sidered. We say that two ⊕˜D-parts of 1⊗N 1, say, Gδ and Gγ are equivalent if for all ⊕˜D-parts G of 1⊗N 1
the following holds: G⊕˜DGδ is well-defined and equal to 1⊗N 1 if and only if G⊕˜DGγ is well-defined and equal
to 1 ⊗N 1. We also write Gδ ≈D Gγ . We write for the ≈D-equivalence class of G either [G] or (abusing the
notation) simply G. It is clear that the equivalence class of a homogeneous element E ⊗N F contains only the
element E ⊗N F , i.e., [E ⊗N F ] = {E ⊗N F}. The partial addition ⊕˜D defined above for ⊕˜D-parts of 1 ⊗N 1
induces a partial addition on the equivalence classes of ⊕˜D-parts of 1⊗N 1 (denoted by the same symbol) by
[Gδ] ⊕˜D [Gγ ] :=
[
Gδ⊕˜DGγ
]
,
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for all Gδ and Gγ for which the right hand side is well-defined. It is clear that every equivalence class [G] contains
at most two elements. Further, if [G] contains more than one element, then the complementary class [G]′ := [G′]
of [G] (defined by [G]⊕˜D[G]′ = [1]) contains only one element but not vice versa. For well-defined ⊕˜D-parts
G ∈ E(H1)⊗NE(H2) of 1 ⊗N 1 with a minimal representation of the form G := (E1⊗NF1)⊕˜D(E2⊗NF2)⊕˜D · · ·
⊕˜D(En⊗NFn) there are two candidates both of which may serve as complements in case they are well-defined,
namely
• G∗ :=
(
E1⊗N
(
1− F 1/2
1
)2)
⊕˜D
(
E2⊗N
(
1− F 1/2
2
)2)
⊕˜D · · · ⊕˜D
(
En⊗N
(
1− F 1/2n
)2)
⊕˜D
⊕˜D
((
1−
(
E
1/2
1
⊕˜E1/2
2
⊕˜ · · · ⊕˜E1/2n
)2)
⊗N1
)
• G∗∗ :=
((
1− E1/2
1
)2
⊗NF1
)
⊕˜D
((
1− E1/2
2
)2
⊗NF2
)
⊕˜D · · · ⊕˜D
((
1− E1/2n
)2
⊗NFn
)
⊕˜D
⊕˜D
(
1⊗N
(
1−
(
F
1/2
1
⊕˜F 1/2
2
⊕˜ · · · ⊕˜F 1/2n
)2))
.
However, if G is well-defined, it is clear that either G∗ or G∗∗ is also well-defined. (If they are both well-defined,
then they are equivalent of course since then also G⊕˜DG∗ and G⊕˜DG∗∗ are both well-defined and equal to
1⊗N1.) Define E(H1)⊗˜DE(H2) as the effect algebra with partial binary operation ⊕˜D as the set consisting of
all ≈D-equivalence classes of well-defined finite ⊕˜D-sums G of elements of the form E1⊗˜DE2 := E1 ⊗N E2 ∈
E(H1)⊗N E(H2), i.e., consisting of all ≈D-equivalence classes of ⊕˜D-parts of 1⊗N 1, subject to the relations
1. n(E1⊗˜DE2) ≡ (nE1)⊗˜DE2 = E1⊗˜D(nE2), for all E1 ∈ (E(H1), ⊕˜), E2 ∈ (E(H2), ⊕˜) and n ∈ N2.
whenever the expressions are well-defined;
2. (E1⊗˜DE2)⊕˜D(E1⊗˜DE˜2) = E1⊗˜D(E2⊕˜E˜2), for all E1 ∈ (E(H1), ⊕˜) and E2, E˜2 ∈ (E(H2), ⊕˜),
whenever the expressions are well-defined;
3. (E1⊗˜DE2)⊕˜D(E˜1⊗˜DE2) = (E1⊕˜E˜1)⊗˜DE2, for all E1, E˜1 ∈ (E(H1), ⊕˜) and E2 ∈ (E(H2), ⊕˜),
whenever the expressions are well-defined.
Lemma 7 The pair (E(H1)⊗˜DE(H2), ⊕˜D) is the tensor product of the D-posets (E(H1), ⊕˜) and
(E(H2), ⊕˜) in the category of N2-semimodules.
Lemma 7 can easily be extended to any finite family E(H1), ...,E(Hn). The decoher-
ence functional d̺̂,S defined above in Equation 14 for pairs (a, b) of homogeneous elements
in (E(H)t1 ⊗N · · · ⊗N E(H)tn)× (E(H)t1 ⊗N · · · ⊗N E(H)tn) can now be extended to an additive
decoherence functional d̺,S on
(
E(H)t1⊗˜D · · · ⊗˜DE(H)tn
)
×
(
E(H)t1⊗˜D · · · ⊗˜DE(H)tn
)
.
Theorem 3 The decoherence functional d̺,S :
(
E(H)t1⊗˜D · · · ⊗˜DE(H)tn
)
×
×
(
E(H)t1⊗˜D · · · ⊗˜DE(H)tn
)
→ C, d̺,S(a, b) := tr
(
C ′t0 (
√
a) ̺C ′t0
(√
b
)†)
, satisfies for all a, b ∈
E(H)t1⊗˜D · · · ⊗˜DE(H)tn
• d̺,S(a, a) ∈ R and d̺,S(a, a) ≥ 0.
• d̺,S(a, b) = d̺,S(b, a)∗.
• d̺,S(1, 1) = 1.
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• d̺,S(0, a) = 0, for all a.
• d̺,S(a1⊕˜Da2, b) = d̺,S(a1, b) + d̺,S(a2, b) for all a1, a2, b ∈ E(H)t1⊗˜D · · · ⊗˜DE(H)tn , for
which the left hand side is well-defined.
Definition 20 Let (T,≤) be a partially ordered set. A T-directed system of D-posets is a
family DT := {Dt, t ∈ T} of D-posets supplied with a family of morphisms fts : Dt → Ds, t, s ∈
T, defined iff t ≤ s, such that
• ftt = idDt, for all t ∈ T;
• If t ≤ s ≤ r in T, then fsrfts = ftr.
Let DT be a T-directed system of D-posets. Then a D-poset L supplied with a family of mor-
phisms {ft : Dt → L}t∈T is called the direct limit of DT if
• If t ≤ s in T, then fsfts = ft;
• If D is a D-poset supplied with a set of morphisms {gt : Dt → D, t ∈ T}, then there exists
a unique morphism g : L→ D, such that gft = gt, for all t ∈ T.
The direct limit of a directed system of D-posets always exists (Pulmannova´, 1995).
Let in the sequel T denote the set of all finite subsets of R partially ordered by set inclusion.
For every t ∈ R set E(H)t := E(H) and for every T = {t1, ..., tn} ∈ T set E(H)T := E(H)t1⊗˜D ·
· · ⊗˜DE(H)tn . Then it has been shown by Pulmannova´ (1995) that for every T ⊂ S ∈ T
there exists a morphism fTS : E(H)T → E(H)S such that {E(H)T , T ∈ T} supplied with
{fTS, T ⊂ S ∈ T} is a T-directed system. Let, e.g., T = {t1, t3} ⊂ S = {t1, t2, t3}, then
fTS(A⊗˜DB) = A⊗˜D1⊗˜DB.
Therefore the direct limit of {(E(H)T , ⊕˜D), T ∈ T} exists and will be denoted by (E(H)T, ⊕˜D).
E(H)T can be constructed as follows: consider the disjoint union ∪T∈TE(H)T and call two
elements h1, h2 of ∪T∈TE(H)T equivalent if there exist T1, T2, T12 ∈ T such that h1 ∈ T1 ⊂ T12,
h2 ∈ T2 ⊂ T12 and such that fT1T12(h1) = fT2T12(h2). Then E(H)T is the quotient space of
∪T∈TE(H)T by the such defined equivalence relation. It is easy to extend the D-poset structures
on E(H)T , for T ∈ T to a D-poset structure on E(H)T. Thus the above defined decoherence
functional can be generalized to a decoherence functional on E(H)T× E(H)T by
d̺,T : E(H)T× E(H)T → C, d̺,T(A,B) := d̺,s(A)∪s(B)
(
fs(A),s(A)∪s(B)A, fs(B),s(A)∪s(B)B
)
,
where s(A) denotes the temporal support of A and s(B) denotes the temporal support of B
and fs(A),s(A)∪s(B) and fs(B),s(A)∪s(B) denote the canonical morphisms in the directed system
{E(H)T , T ∈ T} from E(H)s(A) and from E(H)s(B) to E(H)s(A)∪s(B) respectively.
Lemma 8 The so defined decoherence functional d̺,T satisfies all properties listed in Theorem
3; in particular, d̺,T(a1⊕˜Da2, b) = d̺,T(a1, b) + d̺,T(a2, b) for all a1, a2, b ∈ E(H)T for which the
left hand side is well-defined.
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Now we are ready to formulate the consistency conditions in our generalized history formalism.
Definition 21 Let G be a set of elements of (E(H)T, ⊕˜D). Then an arbitrary subset ∆G of⊕˜
DG is said to be preconsistent with respect to the state ̺ if
Re d̺,T(a, b) = 0, for all a, b ∈ ∆G for which a⊕˜Db is well-defined in ⊕˜DG.
Further,
⊕˜
DG is said to be consistent with respect to the state ̺ if
Re d̺,T(a, b) = 0, for all a, b ∈ ⊕˜DG for which a⊕˜Db is well-defined.
An arbitrary subset G0 of E(H)T is said to be consistent w.r.t. ̺ if there exists a subset G
of E(H)T such that G0 = ⊕˜DG is consistent w.r.t ̺.
Remark 13 Above we have found two sorts of D-posets on which the decoherence functional
can be unambiguously defined such that the decoherence functional is additive in both argu-
ments. The decoherence functional induces a probability measure on consistent sub-D-posets of
(E(H)T, ⊕˜D) and on full D-posets of effect histories. Since effect histories represent the general
physical properties of a quantum system, for a physical description of a quantum system one
needs a probability measure which is defined directly on some set of effect histories. This task
has only be achieved in the latter case for the full D-posets of effect histories. The elements
of E(H)T are not effect histories. Hence in the former case we have to single out those sets
of effect histories for which the description in terms of elements of consistent sub-D-posets of
(E(H)T, ⊕˜D) can be lifted to an unambiguous description in terms of effect histories. Further-
more, it is possible to define a ‘reasoning’ on a D-poset D on which an additive decoherence
functional d is given. Let a, b, c ∈ (D,⊕) be pairwise orthogonal elements, then we say that
a⊕ c =⇒d a⊕ b if d(a⊕ c, a⊕ c) = d(a, a) 6= 0 and d(a⊕ b, a⊕ b) = d(a⊕ b⊕ c, a⊕ b⊕ c) 6= 0.
If d induces a probability measure on D, then the second condition is redundant. Hence we also
have to single out those sets of effect histories for which the reasoning in terms of elements of
consistent sub-D-posets of (E(H)T, ⊕˜D) can be lifted to an unambiguous reasoning in terms of
effect histories.
Remark 14 If ⊕˜DG is consistent w.r.t. ̺, then d̺,T(a, a) can be interpreted as probability of a
in ⊕˜DG .
Remark 15 There is a canonical map N : Efin(H) → E(H)T defined by N(u) := ⊗˜D,t∈s(u)ut.
The decoherence functional d̺,T induces a map d̺,N : Efin(H) × Efin(H) → C, d̺,N(p1, p2) :=
d̺,T(N(p1),N(p2)).
Definition 22 We say that a map F : ∆ ⊂ Ê(H) → E(H)T extends N if F(p) = N(p), for
all p ∈ ∆ ∩ Efin(H).
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Definition 23 A Boolean lattice (B,∨B,∧B,¬B) is said to be an allowed Boolean lattice
of (inhomogeneous) effect histories if the following conditions are satisfied
• B is a Boolean sublattice of Êfin(H); the lattice-operations ∨B and ∧B are the restric-
tions of ∨L and ∧L to B respectively. The lattice-operations ∨B and ∧B are such that a
complementation ¬B can be unambiguously defined on B;
• B is atomic and the set of atoms consists of homogeneous elements;
• The canonical map N : B ∩ Efin(H) → E(H)T defined in Remark 15 can be uniquely
extended to a positive valuation B on B with values in E(H)T, i.e., to a map B: B → E(H)T
satisfying B(b1 ∨B b2) ⊖˜DB(b1) = B(b2)⊖˜DB(b1 ∧B b2), for all b1, b2 ∈ B. This condition
means in particular that the left hand side and the right hand side are well-defined for all
b1, b2 ∈ B.
An allowed Boolean sublattice of Êfin(H) will be briefly denoted by (B, B).
Remark 16 The greatest element 1B and the least element 0B in B do not necessarily coincide
with the greatest element 1 and the least element 0 in Êfin(H) respectively. If the set of atoms
of B contains more than two different elements, then 0B = 0. Every inhomogeneous history in
B is the join of disjoint homogeneous atoms of B.
Remark 17 The decoherence functional d̺,T induces a decoherence functional on B × B by
d̺,B : B × B → C, d̺,B(p1, p2) := d̺,T(B(p1), B(p2)), which is additive in both arguments with
respect to the Boolean lattice structure on B.
Lemma 9 The value B(u) does not depend on the choice of the allowed Boolean lattice of effect
histories B ∋ u.
Proof: If u is a homogeneous history, then the assertion is trivial. If u is an inhomogeneous
history belonging to two allowed Boolean lattices, say (B, B) and (B′, B’), then it is easy to see
that there exist homogeneous histories h1, ..., hn ∈ B ∩ B′ (not necessarily atoms of B and B′)
such that u =
∨n
i=1 hi. Thus B(u) = B’(u). ✷
Definition 24 Let u1 and u2 denote two finite effect histories. Then we say that u1 implies u2
in the state ̺ if u1 and u2 lie in a common allowed Boolean lattice (B, B) of effect histories
and if d̺,B(u1∧Bu2, u1∧Bu2) = d̺,B(u1, u1) 6= 0 and if d̺,B(u1∨Bu2, u1∨Bu2) = d̺,B(u2, u2) 6= 0.
In this case we write u1 =⇒̺ u2.
Remark 18 It is easy to verify that if p1 =⇒̺ p2 is valid in one allowed Boolean lattice, then
p1 =⇒̺ p2 is also valid in every other allowed Boolean lattice of Êfin(H) containing p1 and p2.
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Example: If u1 and u2 are nonzero finite homogeneous effect histories such that u1 ≤ u2
where ≤ denotes the partial order defined in Remark 10, then u1 =⇒̺ u2 for all ̺ for which
d̺,T(u1, u1) 6= 0 and d̺,T(u2, u2) 6= 0. To see this, consider the trivial allowed Boolean lattice
B0 containing only the two elements u1 ≡ 0B0 and u2 ≡ 1B0 .
Remark 19 Let h1 and h2 denote two nonzero ordinary homogeneous histories. If h1 =⇒̺ h2 is
valid for some ̺ in the sense of Section 3, then h1 =⇒̺ h2 is also valid in the sense of Definition
24 and vice versa. To see this, consider the allowed Boolean lattice B of effect histories consisting
of the effect histories h1; h2; h1 ∨B h2; h1 ∧B h2. (h1 ∨B h2 is a possibly inhomogeneous effect
history. It is important not to confuse the notion of ordinary inhomogeneous history as defined
in Section 2 and the notion of inhomogeneous effect history as defined in this section. In this
section the term ‘inhomogeneous history’ is always meant in the sense of Definition 13 (unless
explicitly otherwise stated).) The least element in B is h1∧B h2 and the greatest element in B is
h1 ∨B h2. The atoms in B are h1 and h2. The map B extends N and hence maps homogeneous
histories to their corresponding projection operators on ⊗iHi which in turn can be identified with
the corresponding homogeneous elements in E(H)T, e.g., h1 is mapped to B(h1) = ⊗t∈s(h1)h1,t.
The condition B(b1 ∨B b2) ⊖˜DB(b1) = B(b2)⊖˜DB(b1 ∧B b2), for all b1, b2 ∈ B fixes B on the
inhomogeneous element h1 ∨B h2 of B.
On the other hand consider the set C ⊂ P⊗fin(H) consisting of {h1, h2, h1 ∨ h2, h1 ∧ h2} where
h1 ∨ h2 and h1 ∧ h2 are ordinary histories (possibly inhomogeneous in the sense of Section 2).
The assertion of this remark is now an easy consequence of Definition 24 and Corollary 1.
Definition 25 An allowed Boolean lattice (B, B) is called consistent w.r.t. ̺ if B(B) is
preconsistent w.r.t. ̺.
Theorem 4 Let (B, B) be a consistent allowed Boolean lattice of effect histories. Then the
decoherence functional d̺,T induces a probability functional on B by b 7→ d̺,T(B(b),B(b))d̺,T(B(1B),B(1B)) .
Before formulating the generalized logical rule of interpretation we return briefly to the
discussion of exceptional sets of effect histories. We have already seen above that the D-poset
structure on E(H) is not unique. It is possible to define a countably infinite family of D-poset
structures on E(H). Let α be a rational number with α > 0 and define
A⊕α B :=
(
A1/α +B1/α
)α
, for all A,B ∈ E(H) satisfying A1/α +B1/α ≤ 1.
That these expressions are well-defined is a consequence of the work of Langer (1962). In
particular it follows from Proposition 2 in (Langer, 1962) that Eα is well-defined and that Eα
is itself an effect operator for all E ∈ E(H) and all α ∈ Q, α > 0. The pair (E(H),⊕α) is
a D-poset for every α > 0. Clearly, ⊕1 = ⊕ and ⊕2 = ⊕˜. Moreover, (E(H),⊕α) is an Nα-
semimodule. It is now possible to define the tensor product E1⊗̂α,D · · · ⊗̂α,DEm in the category
of Nα-semimodules to be the D-poset consisting of all ∼α,D-equivalence classes of ⊕α,D-parts
of 1⊗N · · · ⊗N 1 subject to the familiar three relations. The equivalence relation ∼α,D and the
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partial addition ⊕α,D are defined completely analogously to ∼D and ⊕D.
Pick an arbitrary finite homogeneous effect history w0, choose k ∈ N, k > 0 and choose for
all r ∈ {1, ..., m} a k-tuple of times (t∗r,1, t∗r,2, ..., t∗r,k) with t∗r,k > ... > t∗r,2 > t∗r,1 such that
for all r there is no t ∈ s(w0) such that t∗r,l ≥ t ≥ t∗r,l−1 for some 1 < l ≤ k. Now we pick m
effect operators E1, ..., Em and define
√
Er(t) := U(t, ti(wE1,...,Em))
√
ErU(t, ti(wE1,...,Em))
†. Here
ti(wE1,...,Em) denotes the initial time of the effect history wE1,E2,...,Em defined by
s∗m,k(w0) := s(wE1,...,Em) := s(w0) ∪ {t∗1,1, ..., t∗1,k, ..., t∗m,1, ..., t∗m,k} and
(wE1,...,Em)t :=
{
(w0)t : t 6= t∗r,1, ..., t∗r,k
Er(t) : t ∈ {t∗r,1, ..., t∗r,k} .
That is, wE1,...,Em is the extension of w0 by the effects Er(t) at the intermediate times t
∗
r,j , where
r ∈ {1, ..., m} and j ∈ {1, ..., k}.
Define Êk,m := {wE1,...,Em|E1, ..., Em ∈ E(H)}. The above decoherence functional d̺̂,s∗m,k(w0)
restricted to the set Θ(Êk,m) := {Θ(wE1,...,Em)|E1, ..., Em ∈ E(H)} is additive in both arguments,
e.g.,
d̺̂,s∗
m,k
(w0)
(
Θ(wE1⊕2/kD1,...,Em),Θ(wF1,...,Fm)
)
= d̺̂,s∗
m,k
(w0) (Θ(wE1,...,Em),Θ(wF1,...,Fm))
+d̺̂,s∗
m,k
(w0) (Θ(wD1,...,Em),Θ(wF1,...,Fm)) ,
for arbitrary E1, ..., Em, D1, F1, ..., Fm ∈ E(H) for which E1⊕2/kD1 is well-defined. Θ(wE1,...,Em)
depends upon E1, .., Em only through the tensor product E1⊗̂2/k,D · · · ⊗̂2/k,DEm and hence there
is an embedding bk mapping Θ(Êm,k) injectively to E(H1)⊗̂2/k,D· · ·⊗̂2/k,DE(Hm). Thus Θ(Êm,k)
can be identified with the set of all homogeneous elements in E(H1)⊗̂2/k,D · · · ⊗̂2/k,DE(Hm),
i.e., elements of the form E1⊗̂2/k,D · · · ⊗̂2/k,DEm. In this sense E(H1)⊗̂2/k,D · · · ⊗̂2/k,DE(Hm)
can be generated from Θ(Êm,k) by finitely many well-defined ⊕2/k,D-operations, that is, we
write
⊕
2/k,Dbk
(
Θ(Êm,k)
)/
∼2/k,D = E(H1)⊗̂2/k,D · · · ⊗̂2/k,DE(Hm). The decoherence functional
d̺̂,s∗
m,k
(w0) induces a decoherence functional d
bk
̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
on bk
(
Θ(Êm,k)
)
in a trivial way by
dbk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
(a, b) := d̺̂,s∗
m,k
(w0)
(
b−1k (a), b
−1
k (b)
)
.
The right hand side is well-defined since bk maps Θ
(
Êm,k
)
bijectively to bk
(
Θ
(
Êm,k
))
. It is
now easy to see that for arbitrary m ∈ N the decoherence functional dbk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
can be extended
to a ⊕2/k,D-additive functional on the D-poset ⊕2/k,Dbk (Θ(Êm,k))/∼2/k,D.
Let Bk be a subset of the free lattice L
(
Êm,k
)
generated by Êm,k (for m ∈ N, m > 0). We
will say that B̂k := ζ(Bk) is an allowed Boolean lattice of (inhomogeneous) effect
histories of order k if conditions analogous to those in Definition 23 are satisfied, namely
• B̂k is a Boolean sublattice of L
(
Êm,k
)/
∼E;
• B̂k is atomic and the set of atoms consists of homogeneous elements;
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• the map bk ◦ Θ can be uniquely extended to a positive valuation Ik on B̂k with values
in
⊕
2/k,Dbk
(
Θ(Êm,k)
)/
∼2/k,D, i.e., to a map Ik : B̂k → ⊕2/k,Dbk (Θ(Êm,k))/∼2/k,D
satisfying Ik(d1 ∨k d2)⊖2/k,DIk(d1) = Ik(d2)⊖2/k,DIk(d1 ∧k d2) for d1, d2 ∈ B̂k. This
condition means in particular that the left hand side and the right hand side are both
well-defined for all d1, d2 ∈ B̂k. Here ∧k and ∨k denote the lattice-operations on B̂k.
The decoherence functional dbk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
and the map Ik induce a decoherence functional on B̂k×B̂k
by
dIk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
: B̂k × B̂k → C, dIk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
(u, v) := dbk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
(Ik(u), Ik(v)) . (19)
The decoherence functional dIk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
is additive in both arguments with respect to the Boolean
lattice structure on B̂k. Furthermore, we say that an allowed Boolean lattice B̂k of effect histories
of order k is a consistent allowed Boolean lattice of effect histories of order
k if the decoherence functional dIk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
defines a probability measure on the Boolean lattice
B̂k by
p̺,k : B̂k → R, p̺,k(v) := dIk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
(v, v) = dbk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
(Ik(v), Ik(v)) . (20)
It is clear that this p̺,k defines a probability measure on B̂k if and only if Re dIk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
(u, v) =
Re dbk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
(Ik(u), Ik(v)) = 0, for all u, v ∈ B̂k for which Ik(u)⊕2/k,D Ik(v) is well-defined.
Remark 20 It is possible to define the direct limit (E(H)2/k,T,⊕2/k,D) for arbitrary k > 0 and
fixed w0 and to extend the decoherence functional d
Ik
̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
to a decoherence functional on
E(H)2/k,T. We omit the details.
Remark 21 The implication =⇒̺ has been defined above in Definition 24 only for pairs of
effect histories belonging to an allowed Boolean lattice of effect histories (defined with respect
to (E(H)T, ⊕˜D)).
• Analogously we say for two effect histories w1 and w2 belonging to some common allowed
Boolean lattice B̂k of effect histories of order k > 0 that w1 implies w2 in the state ̺ if
dIk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
(w1∧kw2, w1∧kw2) = dIk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
(w1, w1) 6= 0 and if dIk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
(w1∨kw2, w1∨kw2) =
dIk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
(w2, w2) 6= 0. We write w1 =⇒̺ w2.
• For two histories u1 and u2 belonging to a full set E˜ of effect histories, we say that u1
implies u2 in the state ̺ if u1∧u2 is well-defined in E˜ and if p̺(u1∧u2) = p̺(u1) 6= 0.
Here ∧ denotes the partially defined meet operation on E˜ induced by the partially defined
meet operation on Efin(H). We write u1 =⇒̺ u2.
The universal rule of interpretation of quantum mechanics can now be generalized
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Rule 2 Propositions about quantum mechanical systems should solely be expressed in terms
of inhomogeneous effect histories which represent the general physical properties of a quantum
mechanical system.
• Every description of a quantum mechanical system (i.e., probabilistic or predictive state-
ments) should be expressed either
– solely in terms of effect histories belonging to a common consistent allowed Boolean
lattice (B,B) of effect histories. The probability measure on B is induced by the
decoherence functional d̺,T on B;
or
– solely in terms of a consistent allowed Boolean lattice (B̂k, Ik) of effect histories of
order k > 1. The probability measure on B̂k is defined by Equation 20;
or
– solely in terms of effect histories belonging to a full D-poset E˜ of effect histories.
The probability measure on E˜ is defined by Equation 15.
• Every reasoning relates solely effect histories
– belonging to a common allowed Boolean lattice (B, B) of effect histories;
or
– belonging to a common allowed Boolean lattice (B̂k, Ik) of effect histories of order
k > 1;
or
– belonging to a full D-poset of effect histories.
Every reasoning relating histories belonging to a common allowed Boolean lattice (of order
0) should solely be expressed in terms of the logical relations induced by the functional
d̺,B : B × B → C defined in Remark 17 and Definition 24.
Every reasoning relating histories belonging to a common allowed Boolean lattice of order
k > 1 should solely be expressed in terms of the logical relations induced by the functional
dIk̺,s∗
m,k
(w0)
defined in Equation 19 (see also Remark 21).
Every reasoning relating histories belonging to a full D-poset of effect histories should
solely be expressed in terms of the logical relations induced by the probability functional
defined in Equation 15 (see also Remark 21).
Remark 22 It is easy to verify that if p1 =⇒̺ p2 is valid in one allowed Boolean lattice, then
p1 =⇒̺ p2 is also valid in every other allowed Boolean lattice of Êfin(H) containing p1 and p2.
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4.4 The algebraic structure of generalized history theories
We now summarize our discussion by stating the general axioms for a generalized quantum
theory based on our generalized history concept. This subsection parallels the discussion in
(Isham, 1994). However, it contains only a rough summary of the main concepts and structures.
In every particular history theory one has to show that everything is well-defined and consistent
and if necessary to modify the concepts and structures.
1. The space U of history filters or homogeneous histories.
• U is the space of the basic physical properties of a physical system. An element of U
represents the equivalence classes of (operationally undistinguishable) basic entities
(propositions) in the interpretation of the theory. There exists a map F mapping
the elements of U to a D-poset E. E can be interpreted as the set of (equivalence
classes of) one-time propositions. Moreover, there is a canonical map N imbedding
U in a D-poset (M,⊕). [in Section 4.3: U equals the space of homogeneous effect
histories U = Efin(H), cf. Definition 11; E is given by E(H) and F is given by
F (u) = Ct0(u)
†Ct0(u). M = E(H)T].
• U is a partially ordered set with unit history 1 and null history 0.
• U is a partial semigroup with composition law ◦, cf. (Isham, 1994). a ◦ b is well-
defined if tf (a) < ti(b). In this case we say that a proceeds b or that b follows a.
Further, 1 ◦ a = a ◦ 1 = a and a ◦ 0 = 0 ◦ a = 0. If a ◦ b is defined, then a ◦ b = a∧ b,
in particular the right hand side is well-defined.
• The partial ordering on U induces a partial unary operation ¬ (complementation)
and two partial binary operations ∧ and ∨ (meet and join) on U .
2. The space of decoherence functionals.
A decoherence functional is a map d : M×M→ C which satisfies for all α, α′, β ∈M
• d(α, α) ∈ R and d(α, α) ≥ 0.
• d(α, β) = d(β, α)∗.
• d(1, 1) = 1.
• d(0, α) = 0, for all α.
• d(α1 ⊕ α2, β) = d(α1, β) + d(α2, β) for all α1, α2, β ∈ M for which α1 ⊕ α2 is well-
defined.
3. The space U of general history propositions.
• U is the quotient space of the free lattice generated by U by the congruence relation
induced by the partial ordering on U [see Remark 10].
• There exists an embedding τ : U → U, i.e., τ(U) ⊂ U.
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4. The physical interpretation.
• U cannot globally be mapped to U or to M respectively. The physically interesting
subsets of U are the ‘allowed’ Boolean sublattices U0 of U (see Definition 23) on
which the canonical map N can be uniquely extended to a valuation B on U0 with
values in M such that for every u ∈ U′0 the value B(u) of this extension does not
depend upon the particular ‘allowed’ Boolean lattice U′0 chosen.
• The decoherence functional induces a probability measure on the consistent (w.r.t. the
decoherence functional) ‘allowed’ Boolean sublattices of U.
• On the ‘allowed’ Boolean sublattices of U the decoherence functional defines a partial
logical implication which allows to make logical inferences.
• The D-poset (M,⊕) may be not unique. There may be other D-posets (M′,⊕′) con-
taining N(U) such that the decoherence functionals can be extended to ⊕′-additive
functionals on M′ ×M′. It is possible to define ‘allowed’ Boolean sublattices U′0 of
U with respect to M′. The decoherence functional induces a probability measure
on the consistent ‘allowed’ Boolean sublattices U′0 of U. Moreover, the decoherence
functional defines a partial logical implication on the Boolean sublattices U′0 of U.
• there exist D-posets EU of effect histories isomorphic to E [e.g., the full D-poset of
effect histories] on which every decoherence functional induces a probability measure,
i.e., for which there exists a D-poset isomorphism I : EU → E ⊂ N(U) mapping the
space EU bijectively to the D-poset E such that the decoherence functional can be
extended to I(EU) and such that
d (I(a)⊕ I(b), I(a)⊕ I(b)) = d (I(a), I(a)) + d(I(b), I(b)) , for all a, b ∈ EU ,
whenever the left hand side is well-defined. In particular, no consistency condi-
tion is required. Under certain additional conditions it is also possible to define an
unambiguous partial implication on EU .
• All probability measures defined on some consistent allowed Boolean sublattices of
U defined with respect to some of the various D-posets M,M′ or on the D-posets
of histories EU have equal physical status in the theory and have to be treated
egalitarianly. There seems to be no reason to prefer one class over the others.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Above, we have defined the decoherence functional d̺̂,S on pairs of homogeneous elements in
(E(H)t1 ⊗N · · · ⊗N E(H)tn)× (E(H)t1 ⊗N · · · ⊗N E(H)tn) by
d̺̂,S(a, b) := tr
(
C ′t0
(√
a
)
̺C ′t0
(√
b
)†)
,
and noticed that it cannot be extended to a⊕D-additive functional on
(
E(H)t1⊗̂D · · · ⊗̂DE(H)tn
)
×
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×
(
E(H)t1⊗̂D · · · ⊗̂DE(H)tn
)
. However, if we define a decoherence functional d˜̺,S on pairs of
square roots of homogeneous elements in (E(H)t1 ⊗N · · · ⊗N E(H)tn)×(E(H)t1 ⊗N · · · ⊗N E(H)tn)
by
d˜̺,S
(√
a,
√
b
)
:= tr
(
C ′t0
(√
a
)
̺C ′t0
(√
b
)†)
,
then d˜̺,S can straightforwardly be extended to a ⊕D-additive functional on(
E(H)t1⊗̂D · · · ⊗̂DE(H)tn
)
×
(
E(H)t1⊗̂D · · · ⊗̂DE(H)tn
)
. However, this approach and the one
discussed in Section 4.3 are mathematically equivalent since
√
a ⊕D
√
b is well-defined if and
only if
√
a⊕˜Db is well-defined for arbitrary a, b ∈ E(H)t1⊗˜D · · · ⊗˜DE(H)tn .
We add a few remarks about the physical significance of the sets of effect histories of order
k > 0. In such effect histories the physical interesting physical qualities are always repeated
at k successive times. If we restrict ourselves to ordinary physical qualities represented by
projection operators, then repetition of some physical quality adds nothing new. This fact
is mathematically expressed through the equation P1 ⊕α P2 = P1 ⊕ P2 for all α ∈ Q, α > 0
and all projection operators P1 and P2 for which P1 ⊕ P2 is well-defined. Hence, for histories
of ordinary physical qualities all different D-poset structures coincide. The situation that for
effect histories there are different inequivalent algebraic structures (D-poset structures) which
have to be dealt with on the same footing is a new aspect of our generalized history approach.
We have already mentioned above that the set of effects does not fulfil some requirements
which are habitually associated with the notion of property. In particular effects can in general
neither be measured ideally nor repeatedly. Moreover, in general the effect 1 − F cannot be
interpreted as the property complementary to the property represented by the effect F . The
same is true for, e.g., (1 − F 1/2)2. Of course, in mathematical terms 1 − F and (1 − F 1/2)2
simply are the complements of F in the D-posets (E(H),⊕) or (E(H), ⊕˜) respectively. How-
ever, if in a measurement of the effect F the measuring apparatus intended to measure F is
not triggered, then we can say that the effect F has not occurred (trivial) but in general we
cannot say that there is another complementary effect which has occurred instead. This is in
particular true for effects F satisfying F ≤ 1
2
or 1
2
≤ F . Therefore some authors claim that
only regular effects whose spectrum extends both below as well as above the value 1
2
represent
the (unsharp) properties of a quantum mechanical system (Busch et al., 1995). However, in the
present work all effects are treated on the same footing and no ad hoc assumptions are added
to single out effects representing the ‘well-behaved’ properties of a quantum mechanical system.
In the literature of the standard consistent histories approach some authors find it neces-
sary to consider various approximate consistency conditions in order to describe the classical or
the quasiclassical properties of quantum mechanical systems. For instance, Omne`s associates
‘quasi-projectors’ with macroscopic regular cells in classical phase space. However, strictly
speaking histories involving quasi-projectors lie outside the mathematical framework of the
standard consistent histories approach and it is a little bit disconcerting that the discussion
of the (semi)classical limit of quantum mechanics in the consistent histories approach involves
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approximations of the fundamental concepts of the theory, even when it is of ‘no practical
importance.’ This point may seem a bit pedantic at first, but this author nevertheless believes
that it is also a quite unsatisfactory state of affairs in a physical theory. The solution of this
problem should be clear now. Of course, quasi-projectors are only a special sort of effects.
Thus histories of quasi-projectors fit perfectly well in our generalized history theory and no ad
hoc modifications of the basic concepts and principles are necessary in the discussion of the
(semi)classical limit of quantum mechanics.
Gell-Mann and Hartle encounter in their discussions of quasiclassical domains and measure-
ment processes the situation that the consistency conditions and the probability sum rules for
physically interesting histories are only approximately satisfied (see in particular section II.11
in (Hartle, 1991)). The standard ‘for all practical purposes’ argument to justify the use of ap-
proximate probabilities and approximate consistency conditions is that if the violation is small
enough, then no experiment could detect the discrepancy. Dowker and Kent (1996) stress that
‘this seems a rather casual disruption of the mathematical structure of a fundamental theory.’ In-
deed, this question is not a question of practicability but rather a question of principle. While
admittedly approximations of any (reasonable) kind may be used for the computation of the
(numerical) predictions of a theory, the basic principles and concepts of a theory should be for-
mulated without invoking any kind of approximation. Otherwise the result would be a theory
with semantically slippery rules of interpretation or without firm mathematical foundations.
In any case our generalized history approach allows to incorporate any kind of ‘unsharp’ physical
quality into the theory at a fundamental level, regardless whether it describes the quasiclassical
domain of the universe or a measurement situation with limited resolution or other. Histories
of generalized physical qualities and effect histories have a clear-cut status in the theory and
thus concepts of approximate consistency are superfluous. Since these questions are not the
main topic of the present work, we postpone a thorough discussion to the future.
The problem of interpreting a physical theory is of foremost importance in the physical sci-
ence but especially in the case of quantum theory difficult. The axioms of every interpretation of
a physical theory are always introduced by fiat. They are independent of and cannot be derived
from the formalism. Thus it comes as no surprise that no agreement about the interpretation
of quantum mechanics has been achieved yet. Nevertheless even nowadays most physicists do
not care too much about interpretational issues and simply rely on one of the diverse versions
of the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. This interpretation is (as is
well-known) plagued with paradoxes and puzzles such as the subject−object muddle and the
actualization of facts as a consequence of our measurements. One of its basic claims is that
main aspects of the microscopic world are in principle unanalyzable. Furthermore, it has been
stressed by Omne`s (1992) that the Copenhagen interpretation is incomplete. The paradoxes of
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics cannot be resolved but only be removed
by another interpretation of quantum mechanics.
In the last decades there have been several attempts to construct a realistic and individual
interpretation of quantum mechanics. In this work we studied two such attempts, namely the
generalized operational quantum theory and the logical interpretation based on the concept of
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histories. We investigated their interrelationship and constructed a generalized logical inter-
pretation. Both the generalized operational interpretation and the old logical interpretation
can be viewed as special cases of our generalized logical interpretation. Our generalized Rule 2
is, however, only a first tentative step towards a consistent quantum reasoning involving gen-
eralized properties. Unfortunately, there is no general theory of coexistent sets of effects or
generalized observables in quantum mechanics. With such a theory it would presumably be
possible to considerably improve and generalize our approach and find a more natural definition
of the notion of allowed Boolean lattice of effect histories than the one given in Definition 23.
The interpretation of the consistent histories formalism underlying the present work differs
significantly from the wide-spread interpretation succinctly summarized under the name Un-
known Set Interpretation by Kent (1995). Firstly − and perhaps most importantly − we do
not claim that nonrelativistic Hamiltonian quantum mechanics can be applied to the ‘whole
universe,’ see Note 5. Hence, we also do not adopt the view that exactly one history is realized
and describes all of physics. Whether or not the classical and quasiclassical features of the
observable world can be fully understood in the consistent histories formalism is an open prob-
lem. The most promising and most concrete description of the semiclassical limit of quantum
mechanics in the framework of consistent histories has been given by Omne`s (1994, Chapter 6).
Secondly, we assert that different consistent sets of histories are complementary in the sense
described above and should be treated on the same footing (this is completely analogous to
the assertion that position and momentum are complementary variables in the description of
an elementary particle). Quantum theory ascribes probabilities to different possible events.
The propensity that some particular event occurs depends upon the quantum system itself and
upon the integral physical situation. Particularly, in measurement situations the result of the
measurement depends upon the object under study and upon the mode of observation. At
present no rule determining a preferred consistent set of histories for the universe (the Un-
known Set) is known; in our interpretation such a rule will hardly be needed: instead for every
quantum system and every ‘physical situation’ one needs a rule fixing the ‘correct’ consistent
set. In measurement situations the choice of the consistent set is determined by the measuring
apparatuses.
There are three methodical arguments supporting the logical interpretation. Since according
to the logical rule any allowed reasoning relates only properties belonging to some ‘allowed’
Boolean algebra and since there can as a matter of principle never arise a paradoxical or
inconsistent situation in a Boolean logic, all paradoxes and inconsistencies have been expelled
from the language of quantum mechanics by one single simple rule. Thus the three arguments
supporting the logical interpretation are in brief
• Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics with the generalized logical interpretation (and to-
gether with decoherence) gives unambiguous predictions for every conceivable experi-
mental situation in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics;
• Simplicity and economy of principles;
• The logical interpretation is free of logical paradoxes.
45
Examples illustrating the third point have been discussed by Omne`s (1994). However, at least
one mystery has remained. The microscopic world is unanalyzable. Quantum physics as viewed
by the logical interpretation provides no model for what ‘actually happens.’
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